



International Association of  
Chiefs of Police

44 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 200  
Alexandria, VA 22314-2357  
Phone: 703-836-6767; 1-800-THE IACP  
Fax: 703-836-4543  
Web: [www.theiacp.org](http://www.theiacp.org)

**President**  
Terrence M. Cunningham  
Chief of Police  
Wellesley Police Department  
Wellesley, MA

**Immediate Past President**  
Richard M. Beary  
Chief of Police  
University of Central Florida  
Orlando, FL

**First Vice President**  
Donald De Lucca  
Chief of Police  
Doral Police Department  
Doral, FL

**Second Vice President**  
Louis M. Dekmar  
Chief of Police  
LaGrange Police Department  
LaGrange, GA

**Third Vice President**  
Paul M. Cell  
Chief of Police  
Montclair State University  
Police Department  
Montclair, NJ

**Fourth Vice President**  
Steven R. Casstevens  
Chief of Police  
Buffalo Grove Police  
Department  
Buffalo Grove, IL

**Vice President at Large**  
James R. Craze  
Chief of Police  
Greenbelt Police Department  
Greenbelt, MD

**Vice President at Large**  
Richard E. Smith  
Chief of Police  
Wakefield Police Department  
Wakefield, MA

**International Vice President**  
Patrick Stevens  
Chief Commissioner  
Belgian Police Liaison Officer  
Belgian Embassy  
Washington, DC

**Vice President-Treasurer**  
Dwight E. Henninger  
Chief of Police  
Vail Police Department  
Vail, CO

**General Chair Division of State  
Associations of Chiefs of Police**  
John W. Letteney  
Chief of Police  
Apex Police Department  
Apex, NC

**General Chair Division of State and  
Provincial Police**  
Colonel W. Steven Flaherty  
Superintendent  
Virginia State Police  
Richmond, VA

**Parliamentarian**  
Peter L. Carnes  
Chief of Police  
Stonehill College Campus Police & Safety  
Easton, MA

**Executive Director / Chief Executive  
Officer**  
Vincent Talucci  
Alexandria, VA

**Deputy Executive Director**  
Gwen Boniface  
Alexandria, VA

Chief Earl L. Cook  
Alexandria Police Department  
3600 Wheeler Avenue  
Alexandria, VA 22304

April 12, 2016

Dear Chief Cook,

On behalf of the IACP and our management studies team, I am proud to present the final report for the staffing patrol and investigations staffing study that our IACP team conducted on behalf of the City of Alexandria and the Alexandria Police Department. We hope that you find our report useful, informative, and guiding, as you, your staff, and other governmental officials, make decisions regarding the public safety efforts within the city. The report is lengthy and we feel that our recommendations will speak for themselves. Still, we feel compelled to provide some additional information and insights for consumers to consider as they review this document.

Whenever a department or community brings in a consultant to conduct a study of this nature, there is an inherent bias toward finding areas for improvement. Accordingly, study reports generated within this framework tend to focus on recommended changes, or those areas requiring attention. Inherently, those who review the study may logically draw a negative impression. We want to take a moment to ensure that does not occur.

We found the Alexandria Police Department a well-run agency, with conscientious staff at all levels and in all categories. We were impressed with the myriad focal points within the department, and we quickly discovered that the department provides a high-quality service that residents greatly appreciate. The staff at the police department were extremely accommodating and responsive in meeting our demands for their time, resources, and the numerous data we required. Our onsite team was impressed with the attitude and character of the staff, including the officers within the agency who we interviewed, met with, and rode along with during their shifts. The Alexandria Police Department is a premiere law-

enforcement agency, and our team appreciated the opportunity to conduct this study and to work with your organization.

Many of our recommendations are procedural and they do not involve a significant fiscal note. However, we are also recommending the addition of a significant number of personnel. The recommendations include adding up to 18 officers in the patrol division and 8 officers in the traffic/motors unit. We are also recommending an adjustment in the sworn officer strength for the department so that vacancies do not result in staffing falling below optimal operational levels. In addition, we are recommending an expansion of alternative reporting methods, such as telephone reporting and online reporting, which carry with them some financial demands.

There are a few things to consider with respect to these recommendations, and this is particularly true with respect to those that involve the addition of staff. We recognize the financial constraints facing communities, and understand that hiring multiple personnel, even in a larger city, requires significant capital. Our recommendations outline what we feel are best-practices and optimal staffing levels, but we understand that even when leaders agree in principle to fulfilling these needs, it can take multiple budget cycles to accomplish those goals. For this reason, we recommend that agencies and government leaders take the time to prioritize immediate needs and fiscal capabilities and to organize long-range plans to accomplish agreed upon objectives.

We also wish to point out that at first glance, the number of additional staff we are recommending may seem substantial, and some may question the need. It is important to understand that these staff additions cross two different shifts, and two different operational teams. Accordingly, adding the number of officers recommended would only add about five officers per day per shift. It is also worth mentioning that our recommendations correspond to agency workload, and these additions intend to improve overall organizational efficiency and effectiveness.

Finally, we wish to express our appreciation for the opportunity to collaborate with you on this very important project. If you have any further needs, we would welcome the chance to work with you in the future.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mitchell P. Weinzetl". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "M" and a long, sweeping underline.

Mitchell P. Weinzetl  
Assistant Director, Education  
International Association of Chiefs of Police

# ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA POLICE DEPARTMENT

## A Staffing Analysis for Patrol and Investigations

A Study by the International Association of Chiefs of Police



March, 2016

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	i
INTRODUCTION .....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	iv
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - SUMMARY .....	v
CHAPTER I. THE POLICING ENVIRONMENT .....	1
CHAPTER II: ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING .....	17
CHAPTER III: PATROL OPERATIONS.....	22
CHAPTER IV: INVESTIGATIONS.....	72
CHAPTER V: SUPPLEMENTAL RECOMMENDATIONS.....	92
CHAPTER VI: SUMMARY .....	95
APPENDIX A: RESPONSE TIMES BY SECTOR AND HOUR.....	97

## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: Population Trends.....	1
TABLE 2: Population Age Ranges.....	2
TABLE 3: Alexandria City Budgets 2012-2016.....	4
TABLE 4: Alexandria PD Approved Budgets, 2012-2016 .....	4
TABLE 5: Alexandria PD Sworn Staffing Levels 2011-2015 .....	5
TABLE 6: City of Alexandria Part 1 Crimes 2010-2014 .....	6
TABLE 7: City of Alexandria Quality of Life Crime Statistics 2010-2014 .....	6
TABLE 8: City of Alexandria Part 2 Crimes 2010-2014 .....	8
TABLE 9: City of Alexandria Part 1-2 Crimes 2010-2014 .....	9
TABLE 10: Crime Rate Comparisons for Similar Cities .....	10
TABLE 11: Adult Arrests 2010 - 2014.....	11
TABLE 12: Juvenile Arrests 2010 - 2014.....	12
TABLE 13: Traffic Crash Reports 2012-2014 .....	13
TABLE 14: Traffic Enforcement .....	14
TABLE 15: 2014 Frequent Traffic Violations.....	15
TABLE 16: Personnel Allocation Comparisons to Benchmark City Survey – 2014 Data	20
TABLE 17: Annual Separations.....	20
TABLE 18: Experience Profile .....	21
TABLE 19: Authorized Police Sworn Staffing 2015 – Police Operations Bureau .....	23
TABLE 20: Patrol Watch Shift Hours .....	23
TABLE 21: Patrol and Supplemental Patrol Unit Hours.....	24
TABLE 22: Average Cumulative Times – Report and No-Report CFS.....	26
TABLE 23: Officer Workload Survey Results – Reports .....	27
TABLE 24: Obligated Patrol Workload – Model 1 .....	28
TABLE 25: Obligated Patrol Workload – Model 2 .....	28
TABLE 26: Alexandria Police Department Service Totals .....	31
TABLE 27: Call Volume and Duration by Category .....	32
TABLE 28: Alexandria Police Department Most Frequent Activities .....	33
TABLE 29: Top Five Calls by Category - Frequency .....	34

TABLE 30: Top Five Calls by Category – Time Spent .....	35
TABLE 31: Patrol Officer Allocations by Shift and Sector .....	37
TABLE 32: Total Count of CFS by Sector .....	37
TABLE 33: Calls by Priority .....	40
TABLE 34: Response Time by Priority – Call Received to First On-Scene .....	40
TABLE 35: Response Time by Priority – First Assigned to First On-Scene .....	41
TABLE 36: Back-Up Response.....	43
TABLE 37: Call Types Averaging More Than Two Responding Units, 2014 .....	45
TABLE 38: Patrol Availability (Hours) .....	46
TABLE 39: Population and Calls for Service – 100,000 to 250,000 Population; Benchmark City Survey – 2014 Data .....	49
TABLE 40: Obligated Workload – Patrol 30% Model.....	50
TABLE 41: Officer Workload Survey Results – CFS .....	51
TABLE 42: Patrol and Investigation Assignment Comparisons to Benchmark City Survey – 2014 data .....	55
TABLE 43: Patrol vs. Non-Patrol Workload .....	57
TABLE 44: Telephone Response Unit (TRU) Data .....	62
TABLE 45: Motor Vehicle Crash Response – Time Spent .....	70
TABLE 46: Investigations Bureau Staffing .....	76
TABLE 47: Investigations Availability .....	77
TABLE 48: Cases Assigned by Year .....	79
TABLE 49: Cases Assigned by Type 2011 - 2014 .....	80
TABLE 50: Cases Assignment, Clearance, and Arrest by Unit .....	81
TABLE 51: Average Annual Caseloads per Detective 2013-2014 .....	82
TABLE 52: Investigative Capacity per Detective - 2014 .....	82
TABLE 53: Investigations Survey .....	84
TABLE 54: Self-Reported Current and Preferred Investigative Caseload.....	85
TABLE 55: Self-Reported Case Closure Expectations in Days Active .....	86
TABLE 56: Investigations Monthly Activity: September – November 2015 .....	87

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Alexandria Governmental Structure .....	3
Figure 2: APD Table of Organization.....	18
Figure 3: Patrol Beat Boundaries.....	22
Figure 4: Calls for Service 2010-2014 .....	29
Figure 5: Citizen- vs. Officer-Initiated Calls, 2014.....	29
Figure 6: Calls by Day of Week.....	35
Figure 7: Calls by Time of Day.....	36
Figure 8: Calls by Beat and Sector .....	38
Figure 9: Self-Reported Supplemental Workload - 2014 .....	53
Figure 10: Citywide Average Staffing by Average Citizen CFS, by Hour of Day .....	63
Figure 11: Sector 1 Average Staffing by Average Citizen CFS, by Hour of Day .....	64
Figure 12: Sector 2 Average Staffing by Average Citizen CFS, by Hour of Day .....	65
Figure 13: Sector 3 Average Staffing by Average Citizen CFS, by Hour of Day .....	65
Figure 14: CFS by Hour of Day - Heat Map .....	66
Figure 15: CFS Type by Sector and Beat - Heat Map .....	67
Figure 16: Investigations Bureau Organizational Structure .....	72
Figure 17: Crimes Against Persons Organizational Structure.....	73
Figure 18: Property Crimes Organizational Structure.....	74
Figure 19: Vice/Narcotics Organizational Structure .....	75
Figure 20: Response Time by Sector/Hour: All Sectors - All Priorities .....	97
Figure 21: Response Time by Sector/Hour: All Sectors - Emergency Priority .....	97
Figure 22: Response Time by Sector/Hour: All Sectors - Immediate Priority .....	98
Figure 23: Response Time by Sector/Hour: All Sectors - Prompt Priority .....	98
Figure 24: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 1 - All Priorities .....	99
Figure 25: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 1 - Emergency Priority .....	99
Figure 26: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 1 - Immediate Priority .....	100
Figure 27: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 1 - Prompt Priority .....	100
Figure 28: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 2 - All Priorities .....	101
Figure 29: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 2 - Emergency Priority .....	101

Figure 30: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 2 – Immediate Priority .....	102
Figure 31: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 2 – Prompt Priority .....	102
Figure 32: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 3 – All Priorities .....	103
Figure 33: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 3 – Emergency Priority .....	103
Figure 34: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 3 – Immediate Priority .....	104
Figure 35: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 3 – Prompt Priority .....	104

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Alexandria Police Department (APD) is an efficient and well-organized agency with a strong commitment to community policing and collaborative problem solving efforts. Staff at all levels present a high level of commitment and pride in their work and the APD. This study focused on determining staffing levels for patrol and investigations. Our analysis determined that, although the department is currently meeting service demands, the patrol division is in need of augmentation in order to achieve IACP recommended standards for agencies with a community policing focus.

Our recommendations for additional personnel include eighteen officers in patrol, and eight additional personnel in the motors unit, one of whom should be a sergeant. Although this recommendation is substantial in terms of numbers of personnel, it is possible that an internal reallocation of personnel could fill some of these positions. However, in order to determine the viability of this, the department would need to conduct additional study of personnel deployments across the organization. Even if some personnel reallocation is possible, it is likely that hiring a significant number of additional staff will be necessary to satisfy these recommendations. As noted, the organization will need to conduct an additional study of current resource allocations to make these determinations.

The APD should prioritize patrol-staffing augmentation, particularly in light of its relatively high attrition rate. Our analysis revealed that an average of 27 sworn staff have left the agency each year, for the past five years, and that number is trending upward. Although the APD has been successful in hiring enough officers to keep pace with the rate of departures, the length of time required to train each officer results in continual vacancies. These vacancies are primarily located in the patrol and investigations divisions. When combined, the average vacancy rate and this study's recommendation of eighteen additional officers indicate that the patrol division is operating with far fewer officers than what the department authorizes, and what we recommend.

In addition to prioritizing staffing within patrol, APD should establish minimum staffing levels for patrol, based on the recommendations of this study, and then ensure these positions remain filled. This includes an examination of and revision to the work schedule, such that personnel assignments coincide with Calls for Service (CFS) demands.

Our recommendations include a renewed emphasis on community policing throughout the organization, and a renewed focus on using the existing beat structure within the sectors. These recommendations, and those that include supplanting patrol with additional staff, intend to ensure that patrol officers have the work capacity available to

engage in meaningful community policing efforts. It is our assessment that the current condition within APD does not afford patrol officers the opportunity to engage these efforts, and these changes are necessary in order to remedy this.

Based on our observations, interviews, and analysis, the investigations bureau (with the exception of the vice/narcotics unit) appears to have a sufficient allocation of authorized personnel. However, the department has not staffed the number of personnel authorized, and it appears this has generated some operational challenges, including high caseloads, and the deferment of some cases to a closed or inactive status because of a lack of capacity. We recommend backfilling the investigations positions as soon as possible, and like patrol, we recommend prioritizing these positions, ensuring that no vacancies occur or remain.

Although we are not recommending the addition of personnel to either the persons or property units, we are recommending close monitoring of these units to assess staffing needs. Backfilling the open positions in investigations will certainly improve the challenges facing the division, but it is not clear whether filling these positions will be a complete solution. Accordingly, our recommendations include monitoring caseloads and case closure timelines, to assess the operational effectiveness of the division. We also suggest monitoring the number of cases that supervisors defer due to work capacity issues, as this is a measure of overload to that capacity.

One significant recommendation for the investigations division relates to the investigation of instances of Domestic Violence (D/V), and to a lesser degree, At Risk Adults (ARA). The number of D/V and ARA cases at APD are substantial, and the D/V unit currently does not contain a supervisor. Our recommendations include converting one position within that unit to a sergeant, realigning the D/V unit within the organizational structure, and adding a Lethality Assessment Protocol (LAP) for patrol.

We are also recommending a closer analysis of the mission and purpose of the vice/narcotics unit, along with a determination as to appropriate staffing. It is evident, based on our observations, interviews, and analysis, that in its present state, the vice/narcotics unit must supplant itself with additional resources in order to fulfill its mission. The department should evaluate the unit and its purpose, and respond accordingly, based on those findings.

This report outlines the methodology used to conduct our analysis of patrol officer and detective activity and the commensurate staffing needs, and our recommendations emanate from these perspectives. We relied upon the accuracy of data provided by the APD to determine staffing recommendations, and in some cases, the data provided challenged those efforts. We believe that our analysis is balanced, and that it fairly represents the conditions, expectations, and desired outcomes that we studied, and

those which prompted and drove this inquiry. Where we used external data for comparison purposes, we have provided references.

The report that follows contains additional secondary recommendations, as well as a series of details and analysis that support each.

## INTRODUCTION

The City of Alexandria, Virginia, contracted with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to conduct a study of the Alexandria Police Department (APD) to determine staffing levels required to meet organizational mission and goals relative to patrol and investigative responsibilities. To make these determinations, the study focused on the following areas:

- Policing Characteristics and Trends
- Mission, Goals, Values, and Objectives
- Policing Style
- Accountability
- Crime and Crime Workload
- Services and Service Workload
- Organization
- Staffing Requirements and Resource Leveraging
- Patrol Operations
- Traffic Crashes and Enforcement
- Investigations
- Workforce Perspectives
- Patrol Allocation

The IACP team conducted this study in four phases:

Phase I - Data Collection

Phase II - Data Analysis and Evaluation

Phase III - Development of Preliminary Findings

Phase IV - Final Report

Phase I focused on the collection of information about APD operations and policing conditions. The IACP team engaged a combination of data collection techniques, obtaining data from existing sources, and generating new primary research data in areas targeted. As part of the data collection process, our team interviewed more than 40 APD personnel (command, non-command, and non-sworn). IACP staff observed numerous department operations and rode along in a dual role, with officers selected by APD, conducting an interview with the officer, and making operational observations. Policy statements, rules and regulations, statistical reports, and other written documents were gathered by IACP staff, along with a broad array of data sets

including calls for service data, personnel leave data, caseloads for detectives, and training records.

Data collection included a brief survey of APD staff assigned to the investigations division, soliciting their judgments concerning workload, daily activities, and other duties. We also distributed a survey to the patrol division, to collect direct data related to calls for service, report writing, and supplemental work assignments.

Phase II concentrated on analysis and evaluation of data, development of improvement recommendations, and preparation of several drafts of our report. Evaluation involved comparison of policies, procedures, and operations with contemporary professional police standards, which includes a composite of policies and practices favored by the IACP staff. This phase also involved collection of supplementary data, and corroboration of information obtained earlier in the study.

Phase III, which overlapped with Phase II, involved the development of preliminary findings and recommendations. This was a collaborative process involving the study team, in-house IACP advisors, and external subject matter experts. The IACP team shared these results with APD executives to assess their compatibility with client expectations. This process required repeated efforts to corroborate information collected earlier, to fill data gaps, and to obtain feedback on a number of innovations and proposals in the report.

Phase IV entailed the preparation of this final report.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For technical assistance and a continuing demonstration of cooperation, we wish to acknowledge the following individuals:

- Chief of Police Earl L. Cook
- Deputy Chief Dianne Gittins
- Division Chief Mr. Shawn Lasher
- Data Analysis Director Mr. Philip Antonucci

Most of all, our thanks go to all of the men and women of the Alexandria Police Department who participated in interviews, allowed our staff to ride-along with them, and completed surveys and/or took the time to provide information, ideas, and suggestions.

## PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - SUMMARY

### PATROL OPERATIONS

#### **Primary Recommendation**

##### ***Recommendation: Augment Patrol Staffing***

The current level of obligated workload for patrol officers (33.42%-34.56%) exceeds the 30% obligated workload target established in the IACP model. In order to achieve a 30% obligated time ratio, APD should add 13-18 additional personnel to the patrol function. While this recommendation includes a range that emanates from two analytical models, adding 18 officers to patrol (the higher range) would result in 43.09% of the current APD workforce assigned to patrol, which would still be well below the average percentage of officers assigned to patrol (56.48%) among the respondents in the benchmark cities survey.<sup>1</sup> We advocate for increasing the patrol unit by the larger of these numbers.

##### ***Recommendation: Prioritize Patrol Staffing***

The core function of any police agency is the patrol division. Despite this, when vacancies occur, they often result in reductions to the patrol operation. This works against the capability of the organization to maintain a stable patrol workforce, resulting in service reductions. It also affects the capacity of patrol personnel to perform supplemental duties and community policing activities. The department should take a position that all patrol assignments are *essential*, backfilling any vacancies in patrol from less-essential roles (as determined by the department) within the organization (excluding investigations – see below).

##### ***Recommendation: Establish Minimum Patrol Staffing***

A safe and effective patrol workforce is essential to maintaining a safe community. To ensure that officers are safe and effective, and to ensure that service levels are met, the department should establish minimum shift coverages that correlate with the staffing recommendations of this study, and maintain these levels consistently.

##### ***Recommendation: Reemphasize Community Policing as a Department Strategy***

Officers within the APD know that community policing is an organizational philosophy, however, lack of available time has been a convenient and understandable

---

<sup>1</sup> see - <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>

excuse for patrol personnel to conduct minimal, if any, meaningful community policing work. The recommendations above (and others within the report) if implemented, will distribute obligated patrol work in such a way that officers will have sufficient time to engage the community-policing model. The department will need to reemphasize its expectations for officers in this regard, that community policing is an organizational philosophy, not one relegated to a particular unit (e.g. COPS unit), and then implement strategies to ensure this philosophy translates into practice.

***Recommendation: Re-emphasize a Beat-Structured Patrol Response***

The APD has stated and demonstrated its commitment to a community oriented policing strategy. Such a philosophy requires that officers have sufficient time to engage in community policing in a meaningful way, and it requires that officers have a connection to the community they are serving. This is critical so that they can establish relationships with those they serve, and so that they can recognize and understand problems and issues that require attention.

The use of the automated vehicle locator (AVL) system for dispatching priority CFS, and the ensuing philosophy adopted upon its implementation, along with personnel shortages, have reduced the effectiveness of and adherence to the beat structured deployment of personnel within the sectors, resulting in a lack of service continuity by officers in specific geographic areas. We advocate the use of a beat deployment system that encourages and emphasizes geographically structured policing and dispatching, such that officers can develop familiarity with their particular beat, allowing them to establish relationships and to develop collaborative community partnerships and community policing actions. We believe that AVL systems have significant utility. With adjustments to the beat structure, including size, geographic boundaries, and proper staffing, we believe that the AVL system will more often than not, locate personnel available for assignment to CFS within their designated patrol area.

**Secondary Recommendations**

***Recommendation: Reduce Operational Vacancies***

The APD has lost an average of 27 officers per year since 2010, and this number has been trending upward. Although the city recently made a significant investment in the police salary structure to balance officer pay relative to neighboring jurisdictions, in recent years, the number of vacancies has exceeded 10% of the APD sworn workforce (35 vacancies in 2014). This vacancy rate has affected all operational areas within the department, most notably the patrol and investigation bureaus. The lengthy hiring and training process, which can run 15-18 months, complicates this problem. To correct for this issue, we recommend the following:

1. APD should seek authorization from the city for over-hires, effectively hiring personnel in advance of any anticipated vacancies. Given the attrition trend, we recommend a minimum of 25 over-hires. This would allow the department to backfill positions in real-time, and would reduce the operational impact of separations. If the attrition rate declines, the city could reduce the number of authorized over-hires.
2. APD should continue to engage and maintain an aggressive and ongoing recruiting and hiring process, continually accepting applications and promptly vetting them for potential hire. Losing 10% or more of the department's workforce has a substantial impact on the agency, particularly when these vacancies come from critical operational units such as patrol and investigations. Implementation of an ongoing continuous application process for new hires, with regular cut-off dates for processing, can help reduce the loss of personnel.

***Recommendation: Increase the Volume and Types of Incidents Handled by Telephone Reporting Unit and Through Online Reporting.***

Although APD currently has a Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU), the department currently allocates only 1.5 Full-Time Equivalent (FTEs) to it. Reportedly, those on light duty occasionally staff this unit. We recommend increasing the staffing of this unit to ensure that it is available for day and evening CFS needs. Staffing could come from non-sworn personnel, or volunteers. Despite ready access to officers on light duty, we recommend staffing the TRU with other personnel for two reasons. First, the department needs to staff fully the TRU, regardless of the availability of officers on light duty. Second, using sworn personnel for this unit works against the concept of the cost-savings associated with a TRU.

The TRU already handles a modest number of calls, but APD should expand the current activity of the TRU to include more cold crime and property damage (crash) reporting, and other calls that do not require officer response to a scene. APD could create additional efficiency in patrol by more aggressively diverting qualified calls to the TRU.

In addition to expanding the use and functionality of the TRU, APD should consider more intentional efforts to steer callers toward online reporting (these initiatives may require collaboration with the communications center, and additional training). Like the TRU, online reporting can remove a portion of the work burden from the patrol division, freeing them to handle calls for service that are more pressing, and allowing officers to engage in more proactive community service efforts.

### ***Recommendation: Modify the Work Schedule***

Based on our observations and feedback from numerous department members, including patrol officers, and mid- and upper-level supervisors, in its current configuration, the APD work schedule is not providing an appropriate level of functionality. There are significant variances in shift coverage across the sectors; the deployment of personnel does not adequately cover peak demands in calls for service and the use of the power shift over only four days a week leaves a noticeable gap on the remaining three days. Further, the power shift only serves one of the three patrol sectors within the city. In addition, the current schedule does not appear to account for shift vacancies, at times leaving gaps in sectors, and restricting the availability of officers to take leave time.

There are also some unconfirmed indications from our study and analysis that the 12-hour shifts may be contributing to other issues related to sick leave and the generation of comp- and overtime (some external schedule research reports that these are commonalities in 12-hour schedules). We also learned that the schedule design is responsible for a certain amount of *lost hours* for officers related to training. We recommend that the department conduct a thorough analysis of the work schedule to address these concerns.

### ***Recommendation: Improve the Documentation of Officer Activity***

Any effort to conduct a workload analysis relies on the use of data, whether existing historical data or data created for that explicit purpose. APD, like many departments, must be able to justify all requests for future staffing, and this occurs best through quantification and comparison of workload demand against workforce capacity.

The IACP staffing model relies upon an analysis of obligated work time, which essentially covers the requisite time officers need to respond to a call for service, including the time onsite, but excluding time allocated to report writing and other follow-up (which the IACP model allocates to another segment of workload). The current policy at APD often combines these times in CAD, making it difficult to perform a workload demand calculation. We recommend adjusting the policies related to documentation of officer activity relative to calls for service, including the generation of additional codes to track report time and other notable actions the department wishes to track (e.g. community policing). These adjustments will provide the department with better data to assess the efforts of its officers, but more importantly, they will serve to assist the department in replicating the IACP analysis in the future, should they wish to do so.

### ***Recommendation: Augment and Revise the Mission of the Motors Unit***

Motor vehicle crashes within the city are the most frequent activity to which the department responds, accounting for 10.76% of the department's overall activity in 2014. The motors unit is currently responsible for traffic enforcement, and in particular, for monitoring and enforcing traffic violations in and around the top 10 crash locations within the city. While this is an important function in enhancing traffic safety, this unit does not typically directly respond to calls for service, which is the core function of the APD.

We recommend a revision to the mission of the motors unit to include primary response to motor vehicle crashes. The officers in this unit are already responsible for monitoring the top crash locations within the city, and adding this to their duties is a logical extension of their current responsibilities. Although they would not be exclusively responsible for handling motor vehicle crashes, adding this responsibility would reduce a significant burden from the patrol officers, providing additional time for alternative activities.

Adding this responsibility to the motors unit would require additional personnel. The motors unit currently has 10 officers assigned to it. Assigning three officers in each sector, during an early shift and a power shift, would require eighteen officers. Accordingly, we recommend allocating eight additional officers to this unit. To ensure proper span of control, one of these officers should be a sergeant.

### ***Recommendation: Monitor and Manage Back-Up Unit Response***

The *APD Response Plan* dictates how many one-officer units dispatch should send to individual calls for service. This plan suggests a multiple-officer response on a wide variety of calls, and we find no issues with the suggested protocols. Despite this, many departments tend to over-respond to calls for service, resulting in more personnel on-scene than what the situation requires. Moreover, supervisors who are responsible for monitoring these activities are often lax in reducing over-response, and in releasing personnel from the scene as soon as it is evident that their presence is not required.

There is a lack of data available for us to conclude that officers are over-responding, or that supervisors are not managing resources properly in this regard. Still, our analysis indicates many calls for service with a high unit count. Our analysis also revealed 32,418 hours (42.3% of total workload) in response or on-scene time by back-up units. It is possible that these responses are appropriate. However, overresponse to calls for service is a problem that is pervasive among law enforcement agencies. Based on our analysis and our observations throughout the study, it appears this may be an issue in need of additional focus and effort at APD. Accordingly, we recommend continued

monitoring of this issue and a reemphasis for supervisors of their role in monitoring officer response.

## INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU

### Primary Recommendations

#### *Recommendation: Maintain Investigations Staffing for CIS*

Based on the factors examined in this study, current staffing levels in the persons and property investigations areas are sufficient to meet present demands. Further augmentation is not required. However, we recommend that the department fill and maintain all allocated positions within the investigations bureau. In addition, we recommend continued monitoring of caseloads to determine future staffing needs. Other than the adjustment to the domestic violence unit mentioned below, we do not see any other span of control issues that require attention.

#### *Recommendation: Prioritize Investigations Staffing*

The proper functioning of a criminal investigations division within a police agency is vital to its operations, second only in importance to a well-functioning patrol division. However, the investigation function, like uniformed patrol, is susceptible to inefficiency when not properly staffed. Criminal investigations take considerable time, focus, and effort, and when investigators are overwhelmed with a caseload that is prohibitive, it reduces their effectiveness. Accordingly, once appropriate staffing levels in investigations are determined, the department should take appropriate steps to ensure continuous staffing of all positions.

As with the patrol division, the department should take a position that all investigations assignments are *essential* and backfill any vacancies in investigations from personnel in less-essential roles within the organization.

#### *Recommendation: Revisit Staffing for Vice/Narcotics*

In May of 2015, Deputy Chief Huchler, who oversees the investigations division, provided an analysis of and a set of recommendations regarding the Vice/Narcotics section under his command. In his memorandum, Deputy Chief Huchler did a thorough job of explaining safety concerns, and the operational limitations and costs associated with operating the Vice/Narcotics unit in its current configuration. These arguments are sound; the rationale for augmenting this unit is reasonable, and we recommend revisiting this request. In its current configuration and staffing level, this unit is experiencing significant challenges in meeting objectives. The unit is functional, but must often rely on other internal personnel for many operations. Although this seems to be working, it pulls resources from other areas, which is not optimal.

Changes to this unit, made in 2010, involved the reallocation of several officers, previously assigned to the *street crimes unit*. We take no position on the policy decision made in this regard. However, Deputy Chief Huchler's observations and assessment, which other personnel from the unit affirmed during our interviews, suggest that adding staff to this section will improve officer safety and outcomes, and provide the unit with a significant increase in operational functionality. We advocate for further analysis of the needs and mission of this section within the investigations division, and recommend allocating additional personnel as determined by that evaluation.

***Recommendation: Define Expectations and Monitor Case Closure Timelines***

One of the keys to successfully operating an investigations bureau relies upon investigators closing cases with an appropriate balance of speed and thoroughness. Although, for a variety of reasons, some cases take longer to complete, generally the longer an investigator holds a case open, the larger his or her caseload becomes. As the investigator's caseload expands, his or her effectiveness tends to dwindle. Consequently, it is of significant value to ensure that investigators are prompt in their investigations, quickly closing cases they can, and suspending those that are no longer viable.

In our survey of the department's investigators, we asked about unit expectations for case closure. The responses by the investigators, which varied greatly, suggested at a minimum, a lack of clarity in understanding those expectations. The lack of consistency in the responses also suggests that monitoring of case closure timelines may need improvement. Although standard operating procedures (SOPs) outline and identify these expectations, there is an apparent need to affirm these expectations and practices for both investigators and supervisors.

**Secondary Recommendations**

***Recommendation: Utilize the Case Tracking System within Records to its Full Potential***

One of the above primary recommendations involves case closure and monitoring of the investigative caseload by supervisors. Ancillary to this recommendation is the monitoring of the size of the caseloads managed by individual investigators. The new records management system (RMS) at APD has the capacity to track case assignments, to monitor investigator activity (which could be important in future resource determinations), and to conduct regular case reviews by the supervisor. We recommend that all investigation assignments, tracking, and monitoring, occur within this system. Further, we recommend that investigative supervisors engage with other agencies with

the same RMS to determine the best practices and most effective use of the case-tracking module (the vendor can supply you with a recommended list).

***Recommendation: Examine the Case Assignment Process for Investigations***

In our interviews, we learned that various persons review cases for a determination of assignment to investigations. This can occur at the duty sergeant level, by the sergeant reviewing the daily paperwork, or by the supervisor of the investigative unit; officers can also recommend referral of a case to investigations. We also learned that those reviewing cases for assignment rely on *solvability factors*, though this reliance seemed anecdotal, as opposed to being a regimented process.

In our review of APD policy, we found that Appendix A, 10.10, Criminal Investigations [42.1.2] A - Solvability Factors, addresses the value of solvability factors. However, it does not appear that the reporting system integrates these specifically, either directly within records, or through the report of the responding officer. We recommend a modification to the reporting process that intentionally integrates and records the presence of solvability factors. The new RMS at APD has the capacity to do this. Adding these factors to the process will serve two vital purposes. First, officers may approach preliminary investigations differently if they know they must answer each of the solvability factor questions. Second, those reviewing the report for possible assignment can quickly assess its overall solvability factor, which should improve the efficiency and expedience of the case review process. This process may also reduce the need for a second or third review of these reports by other personnel.

***Recommendation: Add Redundancy to the Electronic Forensics Area***

With the advent of everything electronic, the ability of an investigative team to examine various pieces of electronic media forensically has become a necessity. The number of cases requiring such attention is growing, and this area is highly labor intensive. Given the need for this capacity, it is important that departments ensure they have sufficient staff to conduct these analyses. Moreover, this area of investigative work requires great expertise and significant training, to ensure the legal foundation of the collection of this evidence.

To ensure that APD maintains a consistent capacity to conduct such investigations and electronic forensic work, we recommend ensuring redundant training and certification of multiple personnel.

***Recommendation: Consider Revisions to the Domestic Violence Investigations Division and to the Preliminary Investigation of Domestic Violence by Patrol Officers***

1. *Create a Supervisor Position with the D/V investigations Unit*

Domestic violence has become a national focal point throughout law enforcement, and appropriately, many departments have established domestic violence investigation (D/V) units. The D/V unit at APD has three detectives assigned to it, and each handled roughly 300 cases in 2014. This is a large number, but it is actually a reduction from the average in 2013, which was more than 500 each. In our interviews, we learned that the sergeant from the financial crimes unit spends considerable time supplanting the D/V unit, and providing supervisory oversight. Given the volume within this unit, we recommend the conversion of one of the positions within this unit to a sergeant. We also recommend this person carry a regular caseload.

We also considered whether the needs of this unit justify another officer, as opposed to the conversion of one position. It is our assessment that implementing a Lethality Assessment Protocol (LAP) in patrol (as noted immediately below) will reduce the overall demand for this unit, and balance the workload among the three persons (with the sergeant included).

2. *Implement an LAP Protocol within the Patrol Division*

During the course of our interviews, we learned that APD does not use a Lethality Assessment Protocol (LAP) in its domestic violence investigations by patrol officers. We also heard (and noted through the data) that the D/V investigators have a high caseload, which requires substantial work. When implemented properly, the use of an LAP can reduce the incidence of violence against women; and improve the overall quality of the preliminary investigation, ultimately reducing the demand on the D/V investigations unit. We recommend adding an LAP to preliminary domestic violence investigations by patrol. There are existing models available (IACP can assist with this), which can be implemented readily.

3. *Re-organize the DV Investigations Unit*

The D/V investigation unit is currently part of the property crimes section within the criminal investigations division. D/V is a crime against a person, and its location within the organizational structure may be better suited within the crimes against persons section. Aside from the apparent logic in such a move, the D/V unit may benefit from the support staff associated with this section. We

recommend consideration of reorganizing the D/V investigations unit to fall under the crimes against persons section.

## SUPPLEMENTAL RECOMMENDATIONS

As is typical, during the course of our study of the APD, we came upon several items of value that were beyond the initial scope of our contracted work. Because these items are supplemental, we did not perform a deep analysis of each. Therefore, we offer the following items based on our limited engagement and observations in these areas.

### ***Recommendation: Revise the Case Reporting Practice of the Electronic Forensic Team***

At present, the electronic forensic team reports each item examined as a *case* as part of the case assignment totals for the unit, as opposed to reporting only the total number of cases assigned. This type of reporting is deceiving in terms of comparing caseloads against other units. Although there is value in recording the number of devices examined, and this contributes to an understanding of overall workload, we recommend reporting only the total number of case assignments when comparing caseloads against other units.

### ***Recommendation: Training***

#### *1. Training Records:*

In our efforts to quantify the amount of annual training for officers, we discovered several apparent omissions/discrepancies within the training records for individual officers. There may be myriad explanations for these issues, but we are convinced that in many cases, the officer's official training record does not accurately reflect his or her actual attendance at training. This could be a significant issue if the officer's training record comes into question. We recommend a thorough analysis of the record-keeping practices regarding individual officer training, making any necessary procedural revisions to ensure accuracy.

#### *2. Leadership Training:*

During our interviews, we heard from several personnel who indicated there is a lack of available leadership training for those at APD. Like most agencies, those in leadership positions often have access to such training, but aspiring leaders, or those in line-level leadership roles, often do not have regular opportunities for formal leadership training. We recommend an intentional focus on providing leadership training for command and executive leader, line- and mid-level leaders, and for those who aspire to leadership positions. All too often, an officer's first opportunity to attend leadership training occurs after his or her promotion. We advocate for a process that engages these opportunities much sooner, and with greater regularity. This is particularly important for APD, due

to the large turnover, resulting in an inexperienced workforce, and IACP has many resources available to assist with this type of training.

3. *Mentoring:*

Like leadership training, officers often lack the exposure to circumstances that help them learn and grow. We recommend consideration of a formal mentorship program within APD. Further, we would suggest identification of those who have an apparent future as leaders (as assessed by organizational supervisors), as the first invited to take advantage of the new program.

4. *Community Based Policing:*

APD has an organizational philosophy that encourages community-based policing, and this is evident in the training provided at the academy, as well as the community-based project that officers must complete during PTO. However, there is little evidence to suggest that APD offers and/or promotes ongoing training in community policing for seasoned officers. Given the changing climate and the societal demands on law enforcement, we recommend mandatory ongoing community policing training for officers at APD.

***Recommendation: Re-evaluate Specialty Assignments***

The purpose of this study was to examine staffing levels in the patrol and investigations divisions, including an examination of how various units (SRO, K9, and motors, etc.) support the patrol and investigations function. Although these units do provide a certain level of support to both patrol and investigations, specialty units have their own unique function, and as such, they tend to focus their efforts in those areas. In our experience, we have found that some agencies have inadvertently moved away from the core functions of policing, and in some cases, become over-specialized.

Our recommendations concerning additional staffing can be resolved through adding personnel to the department, and our assessment is that the organization needs to hire more staff. However, some of our staffing recommendations may also occur through a reorganization of personnel from other assignments. Notably, the department has a relatively low percentage of its overall sworn strength assigned to patrol responsibilities, which in and of itself, suggests the need to assess where the agency has deployed its personnel. We recommend an internal analysis of all sworn personnel assignments to determine whether specialized units should remain intact, and whether personnel assignments within those units should be supplemented, or reduced. This evaluation should include an examination of the overall organizational structure, including supervisory and command positions.

The following, provided for reference, is a list of sworn personnel at APD who are not included in the Criminal Investigations Division or the Patrol Operations Bureau.

<b>APD's Supporting Units</b>		
<b>Unit</b>	<b>Supervisory</b>	<b>Non-Supervisor</b>
School Resource Officers	1	5
K9	1	7
TAC	1	7
Motors	1	9
CSI	2	9
Parking and Hack	2	0
Certification and Training	2	3
Information Services Section	2	0
Technical Services	1	1
Fleet	1	0
Property	1	0
Administration	2	0
Operations Support Central	3	2
Internal Investigations	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>43</b>

(Excludes Captains)

***Recommendation: Merge the COPS Unit and Crime Prevention Unit***

During the course of our study, we had an opportunity to meet with officers from the COPS unit, and we met with the officer from the crime prevention unit. Through this process, we learned that the crime prevention unit has only one member. We were impressed with the work occurring in each unit, but feel that a single member in the crime prevention unit is likely less effective than what is optimal. Both of these units have a similar mission and believe that combining them would improve the effectiveness of the crime prevention officer, and the COPS unit.

***Recommendation: Improve Internal Communications***

In our conversations with officers and supervisors, we heard mixed comments concerning communication within the department. Many officers expressed strong positive communication with their direct supervisor, but some also expressed that communication up the chain of command was not as effective. Several officers also stated that they felt the line-level supervisors did not have a strong voice with those at the command level.

Virtually every organization has some level of discord with regard to communication. We do not feel that the organizational communication at APD is poor, quite the contrary. We observed good communication and knowledge throughout the organization of various initiatives, which leads us to believe that intentional communication efforts are present. Despite these positive observations, the suggestion that line-level leaders may be having difficulty with communication with command staff is cause for concern. Therefore, we recommend additional engagement of line-level leaders by command personnel to address any communication issues. We also recommend ongoing and continued efforts to encourage communication throughout the organization.

***Recommendation: Examine Staffing for Crime Analysis Unit***

Data driven policing strategies have become a central component to modern policing. Further, using data analytics for predictive policing has also grown in popularity and in value. Because these personnel perform such a vital role, the demands on them are increasing, which challenges their capacity to meet expectations. We did not examine staffing in the crime analysis unit as a part of this study. However, some expressed the need to supplement staffing in this area; we recommend examining this unit to determine an appropriate staffing level.

## CHAPTER I. THE POLICING ENVIRONMENT

Examination of the environment that must be policed, as it is today and as it is likely to be tomorrow, is an essential prerequisite to informed judgments regarding policy, and operational and resource requirements for the Alexandria Police Department (APD). The geography, service population, economic conditions, levels, and composition of crime and disorder, workload, and resources in Alexandria, are salient factors that define and condition the policing requirements, response capacity, and opportunities for innovation. We examine these factors in this chapter.

### SECTION I: SERVICE POPULATION

Historic Alexandria, Virginia, situated on the west side of the Potomac River, just west of Maryland and southwest of Washington D.C, covers just under 16 square miles, and has an estimated population of 146,422 residents in 2014, according to American Community Survey (ACS) data located on the U.S. Census website. The ACS produces population and demographic estimates on an annual basis, but the census bureau is responsible for producing official numbers every 10 years.

Based on census data, Alexandria experienced a population increase of 9.11% between 2000 and 2010, with additional population growth of 4.61% occurring between 2010 and 2014, based on ACS estimates. Based on these trends, expressed in Table 1 below, growth projections estimate that Alexandria's population will reach 152,878 by 2020, which represents an increase of 9.23% (nearly 25,000 people) over the 2010 population.

**TABLE 1: Population Trends**

<b>POPULATION</b>	<b>1980 Census</b>	<b>1990 Census</b>	<b>2000 Census</b>	<b>2010 Census</b>	<b>2014 ACS Est.</b>	<b>2020 Projected</b>
Population	103,217	111,491	128,283	139,966	146,422	152,878
Increase		8,274	16,792	11,683	6,456	12,912
% Change		8.02%	15.06%	9.11%	4.61%	9.23%

Source - <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51/51510.html>; Census and ACS data.

In addition to overall totals, examining population demographics reflects interesting characteristics. Table 2 below reflects population age ranges in 2010 and 2014, as well as projections for the year 2020. In 2014, nearly 61% of the population in Alexandria was between the ages of 20-54. Projections suggest minimal changes to this percentage of the population, with only a slight decline projected by the year 2020. This is important because this segment of the population is significant and active in terms of crime, and service demands.

**TABLE 2: Population Age Ranges**

Population by Age	Census 2010 Number	2010 Percent	ACS 2014 Number	2014 Percent	Percent Change 2010-2014	Projected 2020	Projected 2020 Percent
0 - 4	9,964	7.12%	10,789	7.37%	8.28%	11,614	7.60%
5-9	6,354	4.54%	7,192	4.91%	13.19%	8,030	5.25%
10-14	4,630	3.31%	4,626	3.16%	-0.09%	4,622	3.02%
15 - 19	4,953	3.54%	4,738	3.24%	-4.34%	4,523	2.96%
20 - 24	8,142	5.82%	7,599	5.19%	-6.67%	7,056	4.62%
25 - 34	34,181	24.42%	35,518	24.26%	3.91%	36,855	24.11%
35 - 44	24,793	17.71%	26,300	17.96%	6.08%	27,807	18.19%
45 - 54	18,693	13.36%	19,566	13.36%	4.67%	20,439	13.37%
55 - 59	8,282	5.92%	9,026	6.16%	8.98%	9,770	6.39%
60-64	7,168	5.12%	7,074	4.83%	-1.31%	6,980	4.57%
65 - 74	7,345	5.25%	8,346	5.70%	13.63%	9,347	6.11%
75 - 84	3,540	2.53%	3,760	2.57%	6.21%	3,980	2.60%
85+	1,921	1.37%	1,888	1.29%	-1.72%	1,855	1.21%
<b>Total</b>	<b>139,966</b>		<b>146,422</b>			<b>152,878</b>	


2010-2014 Source: <http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices>; Census and ACS data.

## SECTION II: ALEXANDRIA GOVERNMENT

The City of Alexandria is an independent city, operating under a Council-Manager form of government, with no affiliation to a county. In this form of government, the Council is the governing body of the city, elected by the public. The Council hires the City Manager to carry out the policies it establishes.

The Council consists of six members and an elected Mayor. The Council provides legislative direction, while the Manager is responsible for preparing the budget, and directing day-to-day operations and personnel management. The Mayor and Council, as a governing body, are responsible for setting policy and approving the budget. The Manager serves as the Council’s chief advisor, and serves at the pleasure of the Council. Figure 1 below provides an overview of the governmental structure.

**Figure 1: Alexandria Governmental Structure**



**SECTION III: BUDGET**

Adopted budgets since 2012 reflect an overall increase for the city of 14.52%, see Table 3 below. Growth in the budget has been steady and gradual since 2012, with incremental increases in each of the approved fiscal year (FY) budgets. The city’s approved FY 2016 operating budget represents a 1.95% increase as compared to the 2015 budget. The approved budget reflects community engagement, established priorities, and distribution of funding to targeted areas of focus. The following is an excerpt from a budget brief document from the City of Alexandria:

Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 is the eighth straight year of budgetary challenges for the City of Alexandria as the economy is still only slowly recovering from the recession and has not yet fully regained past job loss.... In FY 2016, the City will

invest \$649.2 million into more than 150 programs, each designed to advance the Long Term Outcomes in the City’s four Focus Areas: Accountable, Effective & Well-Managed Government; 2) Healthy & Thriving Residents; 3) Livable, Green & Prospering City; and 4) Safe, Secure & Just Community....

This year’s budget process further incorporated the Results Alexandria framework, which links spending to long-term outcomes with additional effort placed on engagement.... Due to this engagement, the proposed budget incorporated five priorities: 1) Diversification and expansion of the City’s tax base; 2) Sustained community health and social equity; 3) Educational achievement; 4) Public safety response; and 5) Recruitment and retention of City Staff.<sup>2</sup>

**TABLE 3: Alexandria City Budgets 2012-2016**

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	% Change 2012-2016
Adjusted Budget	\$566,862,748	\$587,861,196	\$618,414,397	\$636,769,901	\$649,156,892	14.52%
Percent Change		3.70%	5.20%	2.97%	1.95%	

Source: City of Alexandria Website Budget Documents 2012-2016

### Alexandria Police Department Budget

Budgets for the Alexandria Police Department increased steadily between 2012 and 2016, see Table 4 below. Over this period, the police department budget has increased 17.16%.

**TABLE 4: Alexandria PD Approved Budgets, 2012-2016**

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	\$ Change 2015-2016
Expenditures	\$51,939,755	\$53,304,483	\$57,556,503	\$57,075,522	\$60,854,883	\$3,779,361
Percent Change		2.63%	7.98%	-0.84%	6.62%	

Source: City of Alexandria Website Budget Documents 2012-2016

On its surface, this amount seems significant, and from a capital outlay perspective, it is a large increase. Despite the substantial fiscal increase, sworn staffing levels in the police department remain stagnant, and have actually declined, shifting from 307 officers in 2011, to 304 positions in 2015, see Table 5 below.

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.alexandriava.gov/uploadedFiles/budget/info/budget2016/FY16ApprovedBudgetInBrief.pdf>

**TABLE 5: Alexandria PD Sworn Staffing Levels 2011-2015**

	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Chief/Deputy Chief	5	5	5	5	5
Captain	8	8	8	8	8
Lieutenant	14	14	14	15	15
Sergeant	42	42	42	41	41
Detective 1-3	46	46	46	45	45
Officer 1-4	192	192	198	194	190
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>313*</b>	<b>308</b>	<b>304</b>

\*Includes four (4) budgeted over-hires.

One explanation for the recent increase in the police department budget, without an increase in sworn strength, rests in the City’s commitment to public safety and staff retention, as identified in the budget brief information provided above. The FY 2016 budget for the police department reflects a pay upgrade for the lieutenant rank, a 9% pay increase for all officers in the department, and an additional 4.5% pay increase for all other police department positions. These increases respond to retention issues relative to the need for competitive salaries, but they do not expand the size of the workforce. The decline in sworn strength is notable, particularly in light of the population growth that has occurred during this timeframe (see Table 1 above for additional details).

#### **SECTION IV: CRIME AND ARRESTS**

##### **Crime**

The IACP team reviewed myriad crime data from a staffing study conducted by the Alexandria Police Department in 2015, as well crime data collected by the State of Virginia. These data outline crime statistics between 2010 and 2014. The tables below represent three different segments of crime data. Under FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) guidelines, Part 1 crimes are those considered most serious, including: homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, arson, and auto theft, see Table 6 below. UCR classifies all remaining crimes as Part 2 crimes; see Table 7 below. Outside of the confines of the UCR guidelines, APD has identified and tracked certain crimes they have classified as *Quality of Life* crimes. Although duplicated in the Part 2 table, for comparison purposes, Table 8 below lists these crimes separately.

**TABLE 6: City of Alexandria Part 1 Crimes 2010-2014**

Crime Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	5 Year Average	Variance from Avg.	2013-2014 Trend
Homicide	3	1	0	5	4	3	1	-20.00%
Rape	20	21	10	14	15	16	-1	7.14%
Robbery	125	130	138	115	139	129	10	20.87%
Aggravated Assault	125	112	96	114	104	110	-6	-8.77%
Burglary	310	308	252	251	257	276	-19	2.39%
Larceny	2,805	2,666	2,467	2,546	2,546	2,606	-60	0.00%
Auto Theft	282	374	320	277	253	301	-48	-8.66%
Totals	3,670	3,612	3,283	3,322	3,318	3,441	-123	-0.12%

Source: Alexandria PD Staffing Study - 2015 (excludes arson)

As indicated above, Part 1 crimes include the crime of arson, however; as collected and reported by APD, arson is included as a Part 2 crime. In order to maintain data integrity, Tables 6 and 7 present the Part 1 and Part 2 crime data as originally reported by APD. In reviewing the Part 1 crime data, there is an overall decline in crime between 2010 and 2014 of about 9.59%. Looking at each of the Part 1 crimes, burglary and larceny are down, as is aggravated assault, however; auto theft is up. Robberies are up sharply between 2013 and 2014 (20.87%); however, the increase over the five-year average (7.19%) is not as substantial. Although this number is less dramatic than the one-year shift, the department may wish to examine the reasons behind this increase.

**TABLE 7: City of Alexandria Quality of Life Crime Statistics 2010-2014**

Crime Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	5 Year Avg.	Variance from Avg.	2013-2014 1 Yr. Trend
Destruction & Vandalism	1,402	1,287	1,133	1,101	1,022	1,189	-167	-7.18%
Prostitution	12	29	17	19	76	31	45	300.00%
Drug/Narcotic Offenses	474	620	604	621	718	607	111	15.62%
Gambling	6	1	3	2	2	3	-1	0.00%
Disorderly Conduct	155	120	133	155	126	138	-12	-18.71%
Driving Under the Influence	327	360	328	349	344	342	2	-1.43%
Drunkenness	581	405	460	476	423	469	-46	-11.13%
Liquor Law Violations	462	390	436	469	490	449	41	4.48%
Totals	3,419	3,212	3,114	3,192	3,201	3,228	-27	0.28%

Source: Alexandria PD Staffing Study 2015

The quality of life crime statistics in Table 7 above, reflect a modest reduction overall, with some categories showing significant shifts. Destruction/vandalism is down by 37.2% from 2010, and drunkenness is down 23.9% during the same period. Although these two statistics are down, narcotics offenses have increased sharply from 2010, by nearly 34%. The reason for these increases is unknown, but in recent years, many jurisdictions across the United States have experienced significant increases in heroin use, resulting in associated increases in drug crimes and other statistics. There is no confirmation this is the case in Alexandria, however, various media outlets have reported similar increases in the State of Virginia. In looking at Tables 6 and 7, it appears that crime is down overall, and that is true; however, because Table 7 is only a partial list, it only provides partial information.

In Table 8 below, the total Part 2 crimes recorded are up slightly from the number reported in 2010 (166 incidents). The increase is more significant, however, when considered against the number of incidents reported in 2013, and 2012.

**TABLE 8: City of Alexandria Part 2 Crimes 2010-2014**

<b>Part II (all other criminal offenses)</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>% Change 2013-2014</b>
All Other Offenses	3,115	3,237	3,132	3,234	3,470	7.30%
Arson	5	6	7	17	10	-41.18%
Assault Offenses	1,279	1,196	1,095	1,110	1,238	11.53%
Bad Checks	56	42	45	29	40	37.93%
Bribery	1	0	0	0	1	100.00%
Counterfeiting/Forgery	67	52	54	59	82	38.98%
Curfew/Loitering/Vagrancy Violations	7	7	13	8	9	12.50%
Destruction/Damage/Vandalism of Property	1,401	1,282	1,132	1,102	1,020	-7.44%
Disorderly Conduct	155	120	133	154	126	-18.18%
Driving Under the Influence	328	360	328	348	343	-1.44%
Drug/Narcotic Offenses	475	623	605	621	717	15.46%
Drunkenness	580	404	460	475	424	-10.74%
Embezzlement	44	45	59	48	57	18.75%
Extortion/Blackmail		1	0	0	0	0.00%
Family Offenses, Nonviolent	8	7	6	7	2	-71.43%
Fraud Offenses	404	352	374	440	557	26.59%
Gambling Offenses	6	1	3	2	2	0.00%
Kidnapping/Abduction	29	32	18	12	19	58.33%
Liquor Law Violations	462	390	436	467	490	4.93%
Peeping Tom	6	7	11	5	6	20.00%
Pornography/Obscene Material	2	4	3	1	1	0.00%
Prostitution Offenses	12	29	17	19	76	300.00%
Runaway	306	262	180	212	261	23.11%
Sex Offenses, Non-forcible	2	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Stolen Property Offenses	47	40	38	19	10	-47.37%
Trespass of Real Property	331	257	221	235	324	37.87%
Weapon Law Violations	52	36	37	45	61	35.56%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9,180</b>	<b>8,792</b>	<b>8,407</b>	<b>8,669</b>	<b>9,346</b>	<b>7.81%</b>

Source: Alexandria PD Staffing Study 2015

In Table 9 below, the totals show that serious crime (Part 1 crime) is down substantially (9.59%) from 2010. Part 2 crimes are up slightly (1.81%) from 2010, but up more remarkably (7.81%) between 2013 and 2014. Taken as a whole, crime in 2014 is up 5.61% over 2013.

**TABLE 9: City of Alexandria Part 1-2 Crimes 2010-2014**

	2010	2013	2014	2010-2014 Change	2013-2014 Change
Part 1 Crimes	3670	3322	3318	-9.59%	-0.12%
Part 2 Crimes	9180	8669	9346	1.81%	7.81%
Total	12850	11991	12664	-1.45%	5.61%

Source: Combined Data from Alexandria Staffing Study 2015

It is a positive sign to see Part 1 crimes declining, as these represent the more serious crimes. However, Part 2 crimes are often the types of criminal activity that tend to affect quality of life within a community. As Table 8 above reflects, fraud and forgery are up, as are narcotics crimes, prostitution, and runaways. These increases suggest the need for additional inquiry and focus.

When examining crime statistics, it is important to consider the local environment (the community), including a comparison of the larger environment (state or national trends). Like other states, Virginia maintains a record of crime statistics from all of its cities. This allows us to compare crime statistics in Alexandria against other communities within Virginia, and Table 10 below includes this comparison.

In Table 10, we have included a list of cities within the State of Virginia, with a population between 100,000 and 250,000. We also included Arlington County, which is similar to Alexandria in size and proximity to Washington D.C. The table reflects crime rates statistically as the number of projected crime victims per 100,000 people living within the jurisdiction. Comparatively, Alexandria's crime rate is low, at 4,060, with only Arlington County having a lower rate (3,433). These rates are well below the rates of the other comparison cities, which start at 6,449 and go as high as 9,455 (Richmond). Overall, these statistics reflect positively on the city of Alexandria, and on the APD.

TABLE 10: Crime Rate Comparisons for Similar Cities

	Population	Incident Rate Per 100,000	Total Incidents	Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter	Kidnapping/Abduction	Forcible Rape	Other Forcible Sex Offenses	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Simple Assault/Intimidation	Arson	Extortion/Blackmail	Burglary	Larceny	Motor Vehicle Theft	Counterfeiting/Forgery	Fraud	Embezzlement	Stolen Property	Destruction/Damage to Property	Drug/ Narcotic Offenses	Non-Forcible Sex Offenses	Pornography	Gambling	Prostitution	Bribery	Weapons	Sworn Officers
Alexandria	155,230	4,060	6,303	4	17	16	11	142	109	1,291	11	0	259	2,651	258	69	519	50	60	1,030	713	0	0	2	76	1	61	306
Arlington County	229,302	3,433	7,873	1	49	27	73	111	164	984	7	5	206	3,227	142	184	1,339	71	61	920	1,037	1	11	1	45	0	54	356
Chesapeake	235,638	6,449	15,196	10	80	50	104	180	742	4,349	19	10	1,021	5,236	278	283	1,511	98	33	1,988	2,497	6	40	5	19	1	267	372
Hampton	138,454	6,937	9,611	9	13	10	52	118	198	1,850	22	0	603	3,611	227	196	559	128	31	1,862	722	8	8	0	0	7	436	291
Newport News	183,362	7,762	14,234	25	60	59	65	237	459	3,538	64	6	898	4,538	323	182	1,488	112	28	2,183	1,200	6	11	1	75	1	704	420
Norfolk	246,394	7,998	19,709	31	42	92	157	392	745	3,769	25	6	1,294	7,875	483	115	734	61	24	3,350	1,379	3	4	2	47	0	172	756
Richmond	213,504	9,455	20,187	41	70	26	74	570	615	4,084	44	10	1,692	6,000	733	344	875	73	47	3,410	2,054	3	72	0	73	2	709	692
Averages				17	47	40	77	250	433	2,838	27	5	853	4,734	349	196	1,004	85	41	2,106	1,372	4	21	2	48	2	343	
Alexandria + or -				-13	-30	-24	-66	-108	-324	-1,547	-16	-5	-594	-2,083	-91	-127	-485	-35	19	-1,076	-659	-4	-21	0	28	-1	-282	
Virginia Cities with City Police Agencies: 100,000 to 250,000 Population																												

Source: [http://www.xsp.state.va.us/downloads/Crime\\_in\\_Virginia\\_2014.pdf](http://www.xsp.state.va.us/downloads/Crime_in_Virginia_2014.pdf)

## Arrests

Examining arrest rates provides an understanding of the types of activities in which the department is engaging, and they help demonstrate clearance rates for various crimes. Table 11 below provides a listing of adult arrests by APD between 2010 and 2014, Table 12 below relates to juveniles.

**TABLE 11: Adult Arrests 2010 - 2014**

Crime Category <b>ARRESTS</b>	Adult					5 Year	Variation	2013-2014
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Average	from Avg.	Trend
Homicide Intentional	1	1	0	2	4	2	2	100.00%
Sex Offense Rape Forcible	12	10	6	12	8	10	-2	-33.33%
Robbery	34	34	49	28	37	36	1	32.14%
Aggravated Assault	70	52	51	50	48	54	-6	-4.00%
Burglary	52	44	42	28	39	41	-2	39.29%
Larceny (Theft)	447	329	306	257	332	334	-2	29.18%
Grand Larceny (Auto)	29	11	21	23	22	21	1	-4.35%
Other Assault	434	422	362	334	363	383	-20	8.68%
Abduction/Kidnapping	5	22	1	5	6	10	-4	20.00%
Arson	3	4	3	0	5	3	2	500.00%
Forgery & Counterfeit	43	24	28	23	17	27	-10	-26.09%
Fraud	100	91	57	98	74	84	-10	-24.49%
Embezzlement	39	32	44	35	37	37	0	5.71%
Stolen Property	11	1	12	4	10	8	2	150.00%
Vandalism	81	71	57	61	68	68	0	11.48%
Weapons	29	23	25	27	37	28	9	37.04%
Prostitution	13	26	17	22	86	33	53	290.91%
Sex Offense Other	20	19	26	28	31	25	6	10.71%
Drug Abuse Violation	435	547	524	500	613	524	89	22.60%
Gambling	23	0	5	6	2	7	-5	-66.67%
Driving Under the Influence	333	370	336	356	343	348	-5	-3.65%
Liquor Laws	548	454	467	545	592	521	71	8.62%
Drunkenness	595	416	437	483	419	470	-51	-13.25%
Disorderly Conduct	145	106	116	141	102	122	-20	-27.66%
All Other Offenses	1,596	1,665	1,521	1,672	1,865	1,664	201	11.54%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>5,098</b>	<b>4,774</b>	<b>4,513</b>	<b>4,740</b>	<b>5,160</b>	<b>4,857</b>	<b>303</b>	<b>8.86%</b>

Source: Alexandria Annual Reports 2010-2014

**TABLE 12: Juvenile Arrests 2010 - 2014**

Crime Category <b>ARRESTS</b>	Juvenile					5 Year	Variation	2013-2014
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Average	from Avg.	Trend
Homicide Intentional	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Sex Offense Rape Forcible	5	0	1	1	2	2	0	100.00%
Robbery	26	52	11	13	12	23	-11	-7.69%
Aggravated Assault	12	9	2	6	6	7	-1	0.00%
Burglary	19	3	3	0	11	7	4	1100.00%
Larceny (Theft)	166	92	75	69	79	96	-17	14.49%
Grand Larceny (Auto)	15	11	13	3	3	9	-6	0.00%
Other Assault	87	60	35	54	59	59	0	9.26%
Abduction/Kidnapping	0	1	0	1	0	1	-1	-100.00%
Arson	1	0	2	2	0	1	-1	-100.00%
Forgery & Counterfeit	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	200.00%
Fraud	0	4	10	5	4	5	-1	-20.00%
Embezzlement	1	2	3	0	0	1	-1	0.00%
Stolen Property	1	1	1	10	0	3	-3	-100.00%
Vandalism	20	16	17	4	19	15	4	375.00%
Weapons	20	5	9	10	12	11	1	20.00%
Prostitution	0	4	0	0	1	1	0	100.00%
Sex Offense Other	3	4	0	2	5	3	2	150.00%
Drug Abuse Violation	88	48	42	47	58	57	1	23.40%
Gambling	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Driving Under the Influence	3	2	1	1	2	2	0	100.00%
Liquor Laws	86	82	74	25	13	56	-43	-48.00%
Drunkenness	2	8	9	2	1	4	-3	-50.00%
Disorderly Conduct	18	18	13	10	13	14	-1	30.00%
All Other Offenses	533	407	258	310	421	386	35	35.81%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>1,107</b>	<b>830</b>	<b>579</b>	<b>575</b>	<b>723</b>	<b>763</b>	<b>-40</b>	<b>25.74%</b>

Source: Alexandria Annual Reports 2010-2014

The five-year adult arrest numbers are fairly consistent with the averages, however, the 2014 arrest numbers showed some significant upward shifts in arrests for prostitution, drug abuse, and theft. These increases correlate to the increases in reported Part 1 and Part 2 crimes. As shown in Table 12, juvenile arrests have fluctuated over the five-year period, with a high of 1,107 in 2010, and a low of 575 in 2013. Juvenile arrests for 2014 were in the middle of these numbers. Notably, arrests for grand larceny and liquor laws are down sharply.

One notable observation is that larceny arrests are down significantly from 2010, for both adults and juveniles. The arrest numbers for 2014 were higher than in 2013, but the number of larceny crimes remains high, particularly relative to the number of arrests. An analysis of larceny crimes by location, day, month, time, etc., may be helpful in understanding this trend, and in forming a strategy for focusing resources.

## SECTION V: TRAFFIC

We examined various traffic data for this study. The number and rate of vehicle crashes and pedestrians struck are the most common measures of the success of traffic functions. Table 13 below depicts the various types of motor vehicle crashes by APD for which there is a report. However, this table does not provide the full statistics relative to the total number of crashes handled by APD on an annual basis. In summary, APD has handled more than 5,000 motor vehicle crashes between 2010 and 2014.

**TABLE 13: Traffic Crash Reports 2012-2014**

Crashes	2012	2013	2014	% of Change 2012-2014
ANGLE	615	606	576	-6.34%
BACKED INTO	58	51	39	-32.76%
BICYCLIST	19	13	16	-15.79%
DEER	1	1	3	200.00%
FIXED OBJECT - OFF ROAD	74	75	77	4.05%
FIXED OBJECT IN ROAD	4	9	13	225.00%
HEAD ON	45	41	35	-22.22%
MOTORCYCLIST	11	13	4	-63.64%
NON - COLLISION	8	4	6	-25.00%
OTHER	55	54	73	32.73%
PEDESTRIAN	60	52	49	-18.33%
REAR END	514	438	429	-16.54%
SIDESWIPE - OPPOSITE DIRECTION	21	22	19	-9.52%
SIDESWIPE - SAME DIRECTION	179	159	162	-9.50%
Unknown	49	40	79	61.22%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,713</b>	<b>1,578</b>	<b>1,580</b>	<b>-7.76%</b>

Source: Alexandria PD Staffing Study 2015

The number of reported crashes is important, as this reflects the current and ongoing challenges related to traffic patterns and traffic enforcement. Although Table 13 shows a modest reduction in crash reports filed by APD in 2013 and 2014 in comparison to 2012, the total number of crashes reported annually during that same period has consistently been over 5,000.

During this same period, traffic enforcement declined significantly, see Table 14 below. Traffic enforcement for 2013 and 2014 were both down by more than 9% from 2012. We are unable to explain this reduction, but it is troubling considering the continued high number of reported motor vehicle crashes. This is a notable issue, which might improve with additional discretionary time for patrol officers, and through augmenting the motors unit, both of which we detail in another section of this report.

**TABLE 14: Traffic Enforcement**

<b>Traffic Enforcement</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>% Change 2012-2014</b>
Traffic Violations	19,687	17,851	17,863	-9.26%
DUI	363	373	354	-2.48%

Source: Alexandria PD Staffing Study 2015

Table 15 below outlines the most common traffic violations cited by APD officers between 2012 and 2014. The 2014 data show significant declines in enforcement compared to 2012, for sign violations (-511) and speeding (-986), including both radar and non-radar violations. Citations for no inspection are also down significantly (-477). These three areas combine for an overall reduction of 1,974 citations, which exceeds the total reduction of citations issued between 2012 and 2014 (-1,824).

Looking at the data in Table 15, thirty violations (combining the radar and non-radar speeding categories) comprise roughly 88% of all of the citations issued. The top 10 categories combine for 11,612 violations, or about 65% of the citations issued.

There are some notable increases in certain categories, including criminal citations, lane violations, and failure to use headlights. However, in aggregate, traffic enforcement is down, and as stated previously, crash rates within the city provide a compelling argument for increased enforcement and attention to traffic issues.

**TABLE 15: 2014 Frequent Traffic Violations**

<b>Citation Type</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
OFFICIAL SIGN (IN APPEAL) 10-3-830	3,034	3,280	2,523
SPEEDING 25 ZONE RADAR 10-3-874	2,662	1,819	1,942
SPEEDING 35 ZONE RADAR 10-3-875	1,801	1,220	1,257
CRIMINAL C--	977	1,017	1,208
REG./LIC/TITLE/NAME/ADDR. 10-3-613	1,101	1,089	1,019
FAIL TO PAY FULL TIME/ATTN 10-3-3	758	816	817
OFF. SIGN - RED LIGHT 10-3-1	785	792	805
NO INSPECTION 10-3-1157	1,206	973	729
NO OPERATORS LICENSE 10-3-300	316	335	417
OFF. SIGN - STOP SIGN 10-3-1	398	303	390
DUI/DWI OF DRUGS/ALCOHOL 18-2-266	363	373	354
SUSPENDED/REVOKED LICENSE 10-3-301	289	274	337
IMPROPER LANE VIOLATION 10-3-804	209	224	330
SUSPENDED/REVOKED LICENSE 46.2-301	392	365	290
RECKLESS/SPEEDING 10-3-862	315	332	276
SPEEDING 25 ZONE 10-3-874	86	93	253
SPEEDING 35 ZONE 10-3-875	141	179	252
DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT 46.2-1003	169	167	245
NO OPERATOR LICENSE 46.2-300	292	304	238
HOV 10-3-2	218	306	233
HEADLIGHTS NOT TURNED ON 46.2-1030	111	141	231
NO U TURN 10-3-845	174	171	229
F/T CARRY LIC/REG 10-3-104	138	134	175
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE 10-3-816	170	172	163
FAIL TO YIELD ON LEFT TURN 10-3-825	169	184	163
RECKLESS/SPEEDING 46.2-862	67	80	130
CROSS DOUBLE LINE/PASS 10-3-804.6	163	148	128
RECKLESS/CHUR/SCH/REC/LOT 10-3-864	234	315	116
DEFECT. BRK. LIGHT VEH 46.2-1014.1	29	63	114
NO CHARGES	153	100	112
NO SIGNAL TURN/BACK/STOP 10-3-848	61	76	111
NO BRAKE LIGHTS 46.2-1014	41	73	103
<b>Sub-Totals</b>	<b>17,022</b>	<b>15,918</b>	<b>15,690</b>
<b>Total Citations</b>	<b>19,687</b>	<b>17,851</b>	<b>17,863</b>
<b>Percentage of Total Citations</b>	<b>86.46%</b>	<b>89.17%</b>	<b>87.84%</b>

Source: Alexandria PD Staffing Study 2015

## SUMMARY

Population growth in the City of Alexandria has been gradual, but steady since 2000, and this growth will likely continue. Despite growth in the city and the police budgets, police department staffing has not increased in recent years, or commensurately with population growth. However, the City of Alexandria's crime rate is one of the lowest in the state, as compared to similarly sized communities, which is a positive sign for those who live, work, and recreate in Alexandria.

It is our assessment that, apart from our recommendations, APD is functioning and managed well, that no major philosophical or operational strategies within the department require adjustment, and there are no significant environmental conditions driving the need for major change.

## CHAPTER II: ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

The organizational structure of the APD includes four bureaus, Patrol Operations, Operations Support, Administrative Services, and Investigations; see Figure 2 below. Within the patrol bureau, there are four divisions: three patrol sectors and patrol support. Sectors 1 - 3 include the patrol personnel who are responsible for handling calls for service. A captain commands each of these sectors, supported by two lieutenants, with one working days and one working nights.


The patrol staff work 12-hour shifts, which creates a *platoon* environment. Each sector has an A-Side and a B-Side, with one side working while the other side is off. Structurally, each side has a day shift and a night shift, with a sergeant assigned to each shift. The day and night shifts both have an early and a late start period, which staggers personnel allocations. The department does not allocate personnel within patrol equally between the sectors; Sector 1 has 34 officers, Sector 2 has 24 officers, and Sector 3 has 55 officers. Sector 3 also has two sergeants working each nightshift. In addition, Sector 3 has a power shift, which includes a sergeant and nine additional officers.

The patrol bureau also includes the patrol support division, commanded by a captain, supported by a lieutenant. The patrol support division houses the community oriented policing (COPS) section, which includes a sergeant and ten officers.

The operations support bureau contains the special operations, and traffic, special events, and parking divisions. The special operations division has several units, including tactical training, intelligence and homeland security, school resource officers (SROs), K-9, crime prevention. The traffic, special events, and parking division also has several units, including motors, special events, parking, and school crossing guards.

The investigations bureau has several sections, most of which fall under the criminal investigations division. The investigations bureau has one captain, two lieutenants, and four sergeants. The supervisory personnel serve in various sections and units within the bureau, including crimes against persons, property crime, crime scene investigations, and vice/narcotics.

Figure 2: APD Table of Organization



Directive 1.3 - Organization Appendix - Organization Chart 01-23-2015

## STAFFING

In Table 5 below, repeated here for reference purposes, we depict the personnel allocations throughout the organization. As noted previously, total sworn staff in the department have declined since 2011.

**TABLE 5 (repeated): Authorized Staffing 2010-2015**

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Chief/Deputy Chief	5	5	5	5	5
Captain	8	8	8	8	8
Lieutenant	14	14	14	15	15
Sergeant	42	42	42	41	41
Detective 1-3	46	46	46	45	45
Officer 1-4	192	192	198	194	190
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>313*</b>	<b>308</b>	<b>304</b>

\*Includes four (4) budgeted over-hires.

When examining staffing levels and allocations, and other organizational metrics and measures, it can be helpful to compare one organization against another to help illustrate any significant variances between them. IACP has conducted numerous prior staffing and organizational studies, and we often look back at these data for this expressed purpose. Another resource that we often reference is the survey of benchmark cities. Several police chiefs created this survey in 1997 as a means to establish comparative statistics. There are 29 agencies currently contributing data to this survey, and we find the site very valuable.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the value in looking at benchmarks and metrics from other communities, it is worth mentioning that these comparisons have limitations; accordingly, our analysis of various organizational and operational factors rely more heavily on data specific to the agency we are studying. Still, benchmark data, and data from other studies, provide a strong comparative value, and we will reference them at various points within this report.

Table 16 below, shows the distribution of personnel at APD, relative to the benchmark cities. For the benchmark survey, executive includes the rank of chief, and two steps below. Mid-level includes three steps below the chief, to the step above line-level supervisor. The numbers reflected by APD in comparison to the benchmark cities are slightly higher, but based on our assessment of staffing they are not a cause for concern.

---

<sup>3</sup> Access to the site is available through the following the URL:  
<http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>

**TABLE 16: Personnel Allocation Comparisons to Benchmark City Survey – 2014 Data**

	Population	Authorized Officers	Executive	Mid-Level Supervisors	First-Line Supervisors	All Others
Benchmark Averages	164,560	231	3.50%	3.30%	12.10%	81.20%
Alexandria Allocation	148,892	304	12	15	41	236
Alexandria Percentage			3.95%	4.93%	13.49%	77.63%

Source: <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>

Attrition is a challenge in Alexandria, as it is with many departments. An analysis of departures over the past five years indicates the department is losing an average of 27.6 sworn staff each year. Table 17 below shows annual separations by reason for 2010-2014.

**TABLE 17: Annual Separations**

Reason	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total	Average
Discharged-DM*	8	7	5	6	3	29	5.8
Resigned	4	9	13	12	19	57	11.4
Retired	5	12	10	12	13	52	10.4
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>27.6</b>

Source: City of Alexandria Human Resources Data

\*Discharged includes termination, resignation associated with an internal affairs investigation, and separation for medical reasons.

Aside from the total number of separations, which we consider significant, the attrition rate is trending upward, doubling since 2010. Further, 19 officers resigned in 2014, which is concerning. We are aware that the city recently approved a 9% increase for all officers within the police department, and indeed, that increase may resolve or reduce salary inequities between APD and neighboring jurisdictions. However, money is but one factor in attrition rates, and it is often not the primary motivation for the departure of personnel. Attrition is expensive, both in hard and soft costs. Accordingly, it would benefit APD to examine this issue more closely to identify any other primary contributing factors.

APD has worked hard to hire staff to fill these vacancies, but this has been hampered by low interest (based on a small numbers of applicants), and a lengthy hiring process. These factors, along with the inability to hire above the sworn strength authorized by the city (referred to as over-hires), have contributed to operational vacancies (untrained personnel who, although employed, cannot perform their job function without the

guidance and assistance of a training officer or supervisor) within the department, which negatively affect organizational effectiveness. This is particularly true for the patrol and investigations divisions. There is a significant need to reduce overall attrition, but also to ensure the minimizing of operational vacancies.

**TABLE 18: Experience Profile**

Section	Average Years
Administrative Services	18
Patrol Operations*	9
Operations Support	21
Investigations**	17

Source: APD Personnel Records

\*123 officers with 5 years or less experience


\*\*3 officers with less than 10 years of experience

The attrition rate has other implications, too, including an inexperienced workforce. Table 18 provides a breakdown of the average experience of personnel in each of the bureaus within APD. The experience profile between the bureaus is notable, if not expected. However, it is significant that 123 officers assigned to patrol operations have five years or less experience; this number exceeds the total number of officers allocated to the patrol division. Inexperienced officers (and sergeants) require more supervision and support, which contributes to the workload of line- and mid-level supervisors.

## CHAPTER III: PATROL OPERATIONS

For functional purposes, APD separates the city into three sectors, each of which contains several sub-sections, or beats. Figure 3 below depicts each of the sectors and beats.

Figure 3: Patrol Beat Boundaries



Within each sector, there are multiple beats. Sectors 1, and 2, each have five beats, and sector 3 has six beats. In the past, APD assigned officers to each of these beats, and policy dictated that officers remain in their respective beat. Recently, the APD and the communications center began to use an Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) system (using GPS) to dispatch the closest unit(s) to calls with the highest priority. Based on our interviews and observations, since the inclusion of AVL, it appears that beat structure has been de-emphasized in importance. Additionally, a lack of available resources, and other personnel deployments (e.g. directed patrol), have hampered the consistent use of a beat structured system. Although still assigned to a beat, it appears that the

expectation for geographic allocation of officers is sector-related, as opposed to beat-related. We also learned that the department has started using more directed patrols, which are also sector deployments. Table 19 below, provides an overview of the assignments to the patrol bureau, including sector assignments.

**TABLE 19: Authorized Police Sworn Staffing 2015 – Police Operations Bureau**

		Deputy Chief	Captain	Lieutenant	Sergeant	Officer or Detective
Patrol Operations		1				
Sector 1	Sector 1		1	2	4	34
Sector 2	Sector 2		1	2	4	24
Sector 3	Sector 3		1	2	8	46
	Power Shift				1	9
Sub-Total						113
Patrol Support			1	1		
	COPS				1	11
	City Council					1
	Court					1
	Police Training				1	15
<b>TOTAL</b>		1	4	7	19	141

Source: Alexandria PD Operational Reports

As previously mentioned, the patrol division has two primary shifts, a dayshift and a nightshift. There are two dayshifts and two nightshifts, and in addition, there is a power-shift. Table 20 below outlines the various shifts within the patrol division.

**TABLE 20: Patrol Watch Shift Hours**

SHIFT	BEGINS	ENDS	HOURS
Dayshift 1	0600	1800	12
Dayshift 2	0800	2000	12
Nightshift 1	1700	0500	12
Nightshift 2	1900	0700	12
Power-shift*	1530	0130	10

\*Power-shift is Wednesday – Saturday only, and only works in sector 3.

Based on our interviews, observations, and a review of the CAD data, the officers assigned to patrol within the sectors are primarily responsible for handling calls for service. There are numerous officers assigned to patrol support, and the operations

support bureau, who do not routinely take calls for service. This is also true for the supervisors within the patrol division.

Table 21 below shows a partial list of allocated work hours captured by CAD (we have provided a full list in a later table). We have separated these into categories that indicate patrol functions, and non-patrol functions. Arguably, some of the time allocated in the patrol category does not relate to calls for service within patrol. Similarly, some of the time within the non-patrol category may be in support of a call that patrol handled. However, without a case-by-case breakdown, we believe these allocations accurately reflect obligated patrol response and that variations within the categories would not significantly affect the categorical totals.

Work effort by patrol, patrol sergeants, community support officers, and K-9 officers, combine for 75,000 hours of obligated time. Time recorded in CAD for non-patrol functions is roughly 4,700 hours. Based on this analysis, it is evident that patrol officers and patrol sergeants are responsible for nearly all of the obligated time associated with calls for service.

**TABLE 21: Patrol and Supplemental Patrol Unit Hours**

<b>Patrol Unit Category (partial list)</b>	<b>(Time) HH:MM:SS</b>
Patrol	69525:27:55
Patrol Sgt.	2519:07:59
Community Support	2220:26:07
K9	776:56:04
Motor Unit	143:31:38
Motor Sgt.	27:30:22
<b>Sub-Totals</b>	<b>76633:58:22</b>
<b>Non-Patrol Data (partial list)</b>	
CSI	1664:39:29
Investigations	1366:41:59
SRO	781:32:08
DUI Detail	157:50:20
<b>Total Non-Patrol Hours</b>	<b>4699:49:04</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>81333:47:26</b>

Source: Alexandria CAD Data 2014

It is also worth mentioning that the time allocated in the non-patrol category is work volume, too. Accordingly, the department must allocate personnel to manage this work. However, it appears that these data are not part of the primary obligated workload of

the patrol division. For that reason, we have excluded these data from workload calculations (we discuss this methodology below in detail).

## SECTION I: PATROL CALL LOAD AND DISTRIBUTION

We examine workload data in several places in this report, most notably those that relate to patrol/field staffing requirements and investigations demand. We use calls for service (CFS) as a means to calculate obligated workload within the patrol division. CFS data are also critical in analyzing timeliness of police response, geographic demands for service, and scheduling and personnel allocations. For analysis purposes, we will provide numerous tables and figures that outline various aspects related to CFS.

### Methodology

The project team obtained a comprehensive CAD data set for calendar year 2014 from APD. The data set contained more than 467,000 records, totaling 132,116 hours of recorded time. Two types of extraneous data within the dataset contributed to a significantly inflated number of recorded hours. Within the CAD data, the *disposition* line was duplicative, and we removed these data (2,088 hours). In addition, the dataset reflected *available* time for officers. The CAD system recorded these data when officers cleared a prior action. The available time in CAD was not time committed to CFS (which we confirmed through APD data analysis staff). When we removed these data (48,695 hours), the dataset contained 81,333 hours.

This total number of hours reflected actual workload hours within CAD, but there were three additional issues inflating these numbers. First, numerous data did not appear to represent response to CFS within patrol. These data belonged to various units with the department, including CSI, investigations, SROs, parking officers, anti-crime, DUI detail, domestic violence detectives, the school crossing guard supervisor, and numerous miscellaneous units associated with the sheriff's department, animal control, and the community college. The sum-total of these hours, shown in Table 19 above, was 4,699. Removal of these hours reduced the obligated work hours to 76,633. We left hours for several other categories of data in the dataset, such as those associated with off duty details, the patrol division commander, motors unit, and patrol admin duty. We concluded that patrol likely would have handled these incidents, had another unit not absorbed them. Accordingly, we counted these hours as part of the CFS workload for patrol.

The second issue relates to the inclusion of report writing time within the CAD data. We learned that the APD policy directs officers to remain checked out on a call with dispatch, for the duration of the CFS; this includes the time they spend writing their reports. This issue presented two problems. First, the IACP workload model relies upon the separation of these hours from the obligated CFS time, as we reflect them in

different segments of the staffing model. Second, we learned there was inconsistency in the application of this practice, meaning that some CFS data contained time associated with report writing, and some did not.

To calculate the total hours within the dataset attributed to report writing, we examined the data more closely. We found that the average cumulative time recorded for CFS involving reports (all units) was over four hours. This is significantly greater than the cumulative time associated with non-report calls, which averaged just over 54 minutes (see Table 22 below).

Table 22 also shows the total number of report calls, which is 12,264, and it includes the cumulative length of time associated with those incidents, which is 50,461 hours. We then turned our attention to the number of report calls that were shorter in duration. Using the time associated with a non-report call (54 minutes), and doubling this amount (1 hour and 48 minutes) to account for the complexities associated with report CFS, we searched CAD to determine the number of report CFS that recorded less cumulative time than this amount. Our search indicated that 3,370 report CFS met this standard. We subtracted this amount from the total number of reports, producing a total of report CFS of 8,894 that recorded cumulative time in excess of 1 hour and 48 minutes. We concluded that these 8,894 CFS, most likely included report writing time within the CAD data.

**TABLE 22: Average Cumulative Times – Report and No-Report CFS**

	<b>Total CFS</b>	<b>Elapsed Time</b>	<b>Avg. Per Call</b>
BLANK	12	4:24:48	0:22:04
CANCELLED	865	106:27:01	0:07:23
FALSE ALARM	3216	1804:42:45	0:33:40
NO REPORT	24429	24101:51:21	0:59:12
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>28522</b>	<b>26017:25:55</b>	<b>0:54:44</b>
CITATION	52	53:13:16	1:01:25
REPORT	12264	50461:24:32	4:06:53
SUPPLEMENT	35	100:50:09	2:52:52
Sub-Total	12351	50615:27:57	4:05:53
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>40873</b>	<b>76632:53:52</b>	<b>1:52:30</b>

Source: Alexandria PD 2014 CAD data

After calculating this number, we turned our focus to quantifying the time associated with report writing for these calls. During the course of our study, we provided officers with a worksheet to record certain workload items. One of the items recorded on the worksheet was the amount of time officers spent writing reports. We received 177

responses from officers, detailing their efforts on 544 reports. Based on these data, we determined that the average report writing time was 55 minutes (see Table 23 below).

**TABLE 23: Officer Workload Survey Results – Reports**

<b>Title</b>	<b>Number</b>
Number of Responses	117
Number of Written Reports	544
Average Reports per Shift	4.6
Average Minutes per Report	55

Using it as a baseline, we multiplied 55 minutes times 8,894 reports, which resulted in a total of 8,153 hours. We concluded that this amount was a fair estimate of the report writing time included in CAD. It is important to note that this number only reflects one report per CFS, and it is highly likely that the CAD data contains report-writing time from more than one officer on numerous CFS. Based on these calculations, we removed 8,153 hours from the patrol workload in CAD.

The third issue involved removing hours associated with follow-up, as opposed to those hours associated with the initial CFS. As with report writing time, the IACP workload model relies upon the separation of these hours, as the IACP model reflects these in different segments. To calculate follow-up hours, and to distinguish them from initial CFS hours, we considered the timespan between the initial CFS, and the arrival of another unit at the incident. We considered and calculated this in two different increments, those who arrived more than 30 minutes after the initial CFS, and those who arrived more than 60 minutes after the initial CFS. Our calculations posit that those arriving more than 30 or 60 minutes after the initial CFS are not typically part of the obligated patrol workload, but rather, they are acting in an investigative, support, or follow-up capacity (again, which we calculate in another segment of our staffing model).

When we separated responding units that arrived more than 30 minutes after the CFS, we found that this removed 6,316 hours from the obligated workload total. We have presented the result of the full calculations for this model in Table 24, which reflects an adjusted workload total of 62,164 hours. We also performed a similar analysis of those officers who arrived at the scene more than 60 minutes after the dispatch of the initial CFS. The result of this calculation was 4,203 hours. Table 25 below, reflects these calculations, and the resulting patrol workload total of 64,277 hours.

**TABLE 24: Obligated Patrol Workload - Model 1**

<b>Patrol Workload Calculation - Model 1</b>	
Total 2014 CAD Hours	132,116
Removal of duplicate entries	-2,088
Removal of "available" time	-48,695
Removal of Non-Patrol workload	-4,700
Removal of Non-Back Up Units >30 Minutes	-6,316
Removal of Report Writing Time	-8,153
<b>Adjusted patrol workload, excluding reports</b>	<b>62,164</b>

**TABLE 25: Obligated Patrol Workload - Model 2**

<b>Patrol Workload Calculation - Model 2</b>	
Total 2014 CAD Hours	132,116
Removal of duplicate entries	-2,088
Removal of "available" time	-48,695
Removal of Non-Patrol workload	-4,700
Removal of Non-Back Up Units >60 Minutes	-4,203
Removal of Report Writing Time	-8,153
<b>Adjusted patrol workload, excluding reports</b>	<b>64,277</b>


We will discuss workload to staffing ratios later in this report, but the above information provides a description of the methodology used to arrive at the obligated workload total.

As we move the discussion in this report to an examination of the various CFS within the department, there is a need for some clarification of the total CFS numbers. Various reports from APD identify the CFS total for the agency for 2014 (excluding officer-initiated activity) at 49,141, with one APD source identifying the total at 49,137. In our calculations, we removed the non-patrol activity associated with several units, including CSI, investigations, SROs, parking officers, etc. In doing so, we reduced the total CFS number to 40,873. Some of the tables and figures in this report reflect 49,137 or 49,141 as the total CFS, and others use 40,873 as the number of CFS associated with the patrol division. We have based our workload calculations on the CFS total of 40,873.

### **CFS Analysis**

Figure 4 below provides an overview of the total CFS for APD from 2010 through 2014, excluding officer-initiated activity. As the figure shows, CFS volume declined between 2010 and 2013 by 9.36%, but increased slightly (about 2.5%) in 2014.


**Figure 4: Calls for Service 2010-2014**



Source: Alexandria PD

Figure 5 below includes officer-initiated activity, showing 28,409 events in 2014.

**Figure 5: Citizen- vs. Officer-Initiated Calls, 2014**



There is little historical data regarding officer-initiated incidents, as APD only started collecting these data in 2013. The officer-initiated activity in in Figure 4 includes situations in which citizens flagged an officer down (1,220), subject stops (2,291), and

traffic stops (24,898). Table 26 below breaks down the officer-initiated activity for 2013 and 2014.

Table 26 below also breaks down the CFS within APD in roughly 40 categories, including both criminal and non-criminal incidents. Most of the individual CFS categories have not changed significantly over the five-year period. Notable exceptions include animal cases, citizen assists, drugs, and suspicion calls, all of which show significant increases. Other areas have gone down over the past five years, including, abandoned autos, ambulance/fire calls, assaults, auto theft, 911 hang-ups calls, fights, loud parties, traffic hazards, unknown trouble, and vandalism.

As noted previously, the totals for CFS remain similar over the five-year period. In essence, as some categories of workload have increased, others have decreased, presenting a similar total of CFS.

**TABLE 26: Alexandria Police Department Service Totals**

<b>Call Type</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>% Change 2013-2014</b>
Abandoned Auto	462	472	324	294	250	-14.97%
Accident	5,320	5,436	5,321	5,083	5,288	4.03%
Alarm	4,685	4,462	4,204	4,133	4,286	3.70%
Ambulance/Fire	952	736	649	642	741	15.42%
Animal Case	1,640	1,247	1,144	1,724	2,197	27.44%
Assault	573	590	529	489	488	-0.20%
Auto Theft	504	597	502	481	436	-9.36%
Auto Theft Recovery	124	159	136	115	113	-1.74%
Bomb Threat	5	10	3	3	1	-66.67%
Burglary	566	574	545	522	535	2.49%
Citizen Assist	1,341	1,452	1,353	1,469	1,662	13.14%
Disorderly	4,397	4,468	4,547	4,230	4,271	0.97%
Domestic Trouble	2,743	2,628	2,413	2,313	2,317	0.17%
Drugs	783	892	883	874	913	4.46%
Drunk	1,064	939	973	924	915	-0.97%
E911 Hang-up Calls	1,291	1,542	979	677	652	-3.69%
Escort	82	47	27	32	28	-12.50%
Fight	545	471	441	383	379	-1.04%
Homicide	3	1	0	5	4	-20.00%
Larceny	3,099	3,185	2,946	3,064	2,903	-5.25%
Locked in Auto	58	52	57	60	70	16.67%
Loud Party / Radio	272	227	161	162	176	8.64%
Missing Person	293	284	291	316	309	-2.22%
Noise Complaint	2,179	2,108	2,156	2,047	2,022	-1.22%
Other	5,097	4,634	4,379	5,186	5,442	4.94%
Parking	3,573	4,195	4,074	4,124	4,084	-0.97%
Phone Calls	365	406	347	341	317	-7.04%
Property Lost / Found	748	777	793	798	881	10.40%
Prowler	7	6	17	6	12	100.00%
Public Service	470	484	487	419	391	-6.68%
Robbery	146	144	178	162	162	0.00%
Sex Offense	167	167	150	160	176	10.00%
Suspicious Event	2,866	3,077	2,793	2,864	3,244	13.27%
Traffic Hazard	925	616	763	547	519	-5.12%
Traffic Problem	340	275	328	387	343	-11.37%
Trespass	550	467	423	483	476	-1.45%
Trouble Unknown	1,539	1,353	1,319	1,130	988	-12.57%

**TABLE 26: Alexandria Police Department Service Totals (contd.)**

Call Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	% Change 2013-2014
Vandalism	1,159	1,072	1,087	969	848	-12.49%
Weapon	252	238	266	305	302	-0.98%
Sub-Totals	51,185	50,490	47,988	47,923	49,141	2.54%
<i>Flag Downs*</i>	nc	nc	nc	1,056	1,220	15.53%
<i>Subject Stops**</i>	nc	nc	nc	1,982	2,291	15.59%
<i>Traffic Stops***</i>	nc	nc	nc	21,542	24,898	15.58%
<b>Totals</b>				<b>72,503</b>	<b>77,550</b>	6.96%

Source: Alexandria PD Staffing Study 2015

In addition to looking at the CFS totals, we examined these based on type, frequency, and distribution. We grouped citizen CFS into three categories for analytical purposes:

- Crime – calls related to criminal activity
- Service – calls of a non-criminal nature, e.g., providing assistance
- Traffic – calls related to vehicle crashes, reckless driving, and other traffic infractions

Table 27 below summarizes the frequency of CFS within these categories, as well as the time spent responding to them. Again, these data reflect the CFS totals after removing non-patrol responses, and they do not include officer-initiated activity.

**TABLE 27: Call Volume and Duration by Category**

Call Category	Count of Calls	% of Total Calls	Sum of Time Spent (H:M:S)	% of Total Time Spent
Crime	24,979	61.11%	54374:05:01	70.95%
Service	9,546	23.36%	10863:04:17	14.18%
Traffic	6,348	15.53%	11395:44:34	14.87%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>40,873</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>76632:53:52</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Alexandria PD 2014 CAD data

The vast majority of the department’s efforts are dedicated to crime and crime-related activities. This suggests that a significant amount of an officer’s time involves these types of CFS, which also include additional workload such as report writing and the collection of evidence.

Taken as a percentage of the work volume, service and traffic volumes are small. However, both of these categories account for more than 10,000 hours of work effort, and it is valuable to consider which types of activity contribute to these totals. In Table

28 below, we list the 10 most frequent activities for APD, including the catchall category of *other*. These 11 categories account for 76.75% of the department's activity. What is remarkable is that motor vehicle crashes and alarms combined, account for 9,574 incidents, which translates into nearly 19.5% of the department's CFS activity.

**TABLE 28: Alexandria Police Department Most Frequent Activities**

Call Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	% of 2014 Total
Other	5,097	4,634	4,379	5,186	5,442	11.07%
Accident	5,320	5,436	5,321	5,083	5,288	10.76%
Alarm	4,685	4,462	4,204	4,133	4,286	8.72%
Disorderly	4,397	4,468	4,547	4,230	4,271	8.69%
Parking	3,573	4,195	4,074	4,124	4,084	8.31%
Suspicious Event	2,866	3,077	2,793	2,864	3,244	6.60%
Larceny	3,099	3,185	2,946	3,064	2,903	5.91%
Domestic Trouble	2,743	2,628	2,413	2,313	2,317	4.72%
Animal Case	1,640	1,247	1,144	1,724	2,197	4.47%
Noise Complaint	2,179	2,108	2,156	2,047	2,022	4.11%
Citizen Assist	1,341	1,452	1,353	1,469	1,662	3.38%
<b>Sub-Totals</b>	<b>38,950</b>	<b>38,903</b>	<b>37,342</b>	<b>38,250</b>	<b>39,730</b>	<b>76.75%</b>
<b>CFS-Totals (see Table 24)</b>	<b>51,185</b>	<b>50,490</b>	<b>47,988</b>	<b>47,923</b>	<b>49,141</b>	

<i>Flag Downs*</i>	nc	nc	nc	1,056	1,220
<i>Subject Stops**</i>	nc	nc	nc	1,982	2,291
<i>Traffic Stops***</i>	nc	nc	nc	21,542	24,898
<b>Totals</b>				<b>72,503</b>	<b>77,550</b>

Source: Alexandria PD Staffing Study 2015

In Table 29 below, we have provided a breakdown of the five most frequent CFS within each of the categories.

**TABLE 29: Top Five Calls by Category - Frequency**

	<b>Count of Calls</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
<b>Crime</b>	<b>24,979</b>	<b>61.1%</b>
DISORDERLY CONDUCT	4,252	10.4%
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	2,313	5.7%
LARCENY	2,291	5.6%
NOISE VIOLATION	1,954	4.8%
SUSPICIOUS EVENT	3,202	7.8%
<b>Service</b>	<b>9,546</b>	<b>23.4%</b>
ALARM	4,657	11.4%
ASSIST CITIZEN	1,672	4.1%
ASSIST OUTSIDE AGENCY	429	1.0%
E911 911 HANG UP	653	1.6%
PROPERTY FOUND	453	1.1%
<b>Traffic</b>	<b>6,348</b>	<b>15.5%</b>
ACCIDENT HIT AND RUN PROPERTY DAMAGE	954	2.3%
ACCIDENT PERSONAL INJURY	405	1.0%
ACCIDENT PROPERTY DAMAGE	3,028	7.4%
DISABLED MOTORIST	502	1.2%
HAZARD	490	1.2%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>40,873</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: Alexandria PD 2014 CAD data


These numbers, which we display in Table 30 below, change slightly (compared to Table 29) when we examine which CFS require the most time. CFS of particular interest include alarms, which top the list for service calls. Put into perspective, alarms, which account for 2,500 hours of work effort, effectively absorb all of the available obligated work hours for five patrol officers. Looking at the time spent on motor vehicle crashes, the department exhausted just over 10,000 hours of work effort in this area in 2014. This amount effectively accounts for the entire obligated work hours for twenty officers. Taken in sum, these two categories are consuming the available workload for nearly one-quarter of the patrol division.

**TABLE 30: Top Five Calls by Category – Time Spent**

	<b>Total Time Spent</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
<b>Crime</b>	<b>54374:05:01</b>	<b>71.0%</b>
DISORDERLY CONDUCT	5932:20:05	7.7%
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	6903:02:42	9.0%
LARCENY	5581:23:40	7.3%
SUSPICIOUS EVENT	3753:36:38	4.9%
WARRANT SERVICE	3499:00:40	4.6%
<b>Service</b>	<b>10863:04:17</b>	<b>14.2%</b>
ALARM	2592:15:15	3.4%
ASSIST CITIZEN	2363:38:59	3.1%
ASSIST OUTSIDE AGENCY	872:29:51	1.1%
MENTAL HEALTH CASE	1366:30:29	1.8%
MISSING PERSON	1046:12:41	1.4%
<b>Traffic</b>	<b>11395:44:34</b>	<b>14.9%</b>
ACCIDENT CITY PROPERTY DAMAGE	740:24:06	1.0%
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS UNKNOWN	1148:02:34	1.5%
ACCIDENT HIT AND RUN PROPERTY DAMAGE	2045:36:48	2.7%
ACCIDENT PERSONAL INJURY	1744:33:09	2.3%
ACCIDENT PROPERTY DAMAGE	4432:52:54	5.8%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>76632:53:52</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

We also analyzed CFS distribution from several perspectives, including time of day, day of the week, and by sector and beat. Figure 6 below shows the overall CFS distribution within APD across the entire department.

**Figure 6: Calls by Day of Week**




Source: Alexandria PD 2014 CAD data

The distribution of CFS across days of the week is typical, and mirrors other police agencies. It is common to record more activity on the weekend (particularly Friday and Saturday), and because Alexandria is also a regional retail and tourist destination, we would expect to see a distribution of this nature.

Figure 7 below shows the distribution of CFS by time of day across the city. Like the daily distribution, this hourly distribution is typical for law enforcement agencies. This figure shows significant increases in CFS starting at about 7:00 AM and climbing throughout the day. CFS demands increase dramatically in the late afternoon, peaking between 5:00 PM and 8:00 PM. Call volumes at this time of the day are more than double the CFS volumes at 7:00 AM.

**Figure 7: Calls by Time of Day**



Source: Alexandria PD 204 CAD data

The distribution of CFS by hour of the day is an important analysis point, because it provides an understanding of how call volume relates to shift coverage and personnel allocations. As identified in Table 20, the patrol dayshifts start at 6:00 AM and at 8:00 AM, and patrol overnight shifts start at 5:00 PM and 7:00 PM. The first and second AM shifts only overlap the first and second PM shifts by one hour. These overlaps are helpful for ensuring that officers finishing their tour can do so on time, but they do little to assist with managing peak CFS during the hours between 3:00 PM and 11:00 PM.

In looking at Figure 7 above, hourly CFS between midnight and 8:00 AM are at or below 1,500. In contrast, CFS between noon and 11:00 PM are at or above 2,000 by hour, peaking at or above 2,500 by hour between 5:00 PM and 8:00 PM. To determine the extent to which personnel allocations in the department respond to service demands, we began by looking at the distribution of personnel within patrol, against these totals.

In Table 31 below, we show the assignments of patrol personnel by shift (day- or night-shift), and by sector. Excluding the power shift, which only supports sector 3, the distribution of personnel between the sectors is very similar, with only one additional officer working the night shift, as opposed to the day shift. Based on this analysis, there is not a proper distribution of personnel by shift, based on demand. Adding the power shift in sector 3 responds to the hourly CFS demands, but this is only true Wednesday through Saturday.

**TABLE 31: Patrol Officer Allocations by Shift and Sector**

	Sector 1	Sector 2	Sector 3	Totals
Days A	8	6	13	27
Nights A	9	5	11	25
Days B	8	7	10	25
Nights B	9	6	12	27
Power*			9	9
<b>Totals</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>Pct. of Officers</b>	<b>30.09%</b>	<b>21.24%</b>	<b>48.67%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Note: Excludes supervisors

In addition to examining personnel allocations by shift and hour, we also examined the distribution of personnel based on the needs within each sector. To make this determination, we first calculated the percentage of patrol personnel assigned to each sector, which we outline in Table 31 above. We then looked at the distribution of CFS by sector; we have provided these totals in Table 32 below.

Based on these calculations, the distribution of personnel by sector appears appropriate. Sector 1 has 30.09% of the personnel, and the CFS represent 30% of the total. Sector 2 has 21.24% of the personnel, and CFS total 19.02%. Sector 3 is the busiest sector, with 48.67% of the personnel assigned to it, and CFS totals representing 50.98%.

**TABLE 32: Total Count of CFS by Sector**

Sector	CFS Number	Pct. of CFS
1	11,781	30.00%
2	7,469	19.02%
3	20,017	50.98%
<b>Grand Total*</b>	<b>39,267</b>	<b>100.00%</b>


Source: APD 2014 CAD Data

\*Excludes CFS with no sector assigned

Although these personnel allocations seem appropriate from a proportional perspective, they do not account for variances within the beats within each of the sectors. In addition, they do not demonstrate the capability of each sector to manage

workload demand in the most effective and efficient manner. Figure 8 below shows the distribution of CFS by sector, broken down by the different beats within each sector.

**Figure 8: Calls by Beat and Sector**



Source: Alexandria PD 2014 CAD data

Based on our observations and interviews with staff, we learned that recently, the department, in collaboration with the communications center, moved to a dispatch system that utilizes automated vehicle location (AVL) software through GPS to locate the closest patrol unit to priority CFS. We also learned that due partly to this change, and shortages of personnel, the department has de-emphasized the beat system within the sectors, relying instead on a sector-focused distribution of personnel. Further, we learned that in addition to de-emphasizing beat-based patrolling, the department has increased the use of directed patrols in areas requiring increased focus.

In looking at Figure 8 above, it is evident that CFS distribution within the beats, within each sector, is unequal. In sector 1, beat 12 is nearly double the CFS volume of beat 15, and there is a similar pattern in sector 2 between beats 23 and 22. In sector 3, the pattern is even more dramatic, with CFS in beat 34 at nearly 5,000, as compared to beat 31, which totals about 2,000.

Beat structures provide police agencies with a means to track activity in geographical sections, and they provide an understanding of how to deploy personnel. The current system at APD does not appear to utilize these data for deployment of personnel, other than using directed patrols in areas where the department has identified problems, or otherwise feels a desire to increase patrols.

From a community-policing perspective, using a beat system contributes to continuity of personnel within a geographical area. This provides officers with an opportunity to learn the intimate details of their patrol area, including any significant issues or problems. In addition, because of their ongoing presence in the area, officers tend to encounter the same individuals with regularity, adding to their familiarity with those in the area. This improves the officer's ability to recognize criminal activity, and it contributes to relationship building.

The current beat structure at APD is not in use as intended. Further, distribution of personnel within the sectors does not intentionally respond to demands, based on CFS needs. Part of the issue with using the beat structure as currently designed, involves the availability of personnel, or the lack thereof. When the number of personnel assigned to a sector within a given shift is at the minimal staffing level, officers will routinely need to respond to another beat, to ensure they meet service demands from the public.

To correct for these issues, we recommend that APD consider adjusting the beat/sector boundaries, and reducing the number of beats. The current beat system includes five beats in sectors 1, and 2, and six beats in sector 3. Reducing the number of beats in each of the sectors would serve three primary purposes. First, it would allow for the assignment of multiple personnel to each beat (especially with additional patrol resources). This would help ensure that the same officers are patrolling the same area with some regularity, contributing to officer effectiveness and community policing objectives. It will also contribute to the AVL system, locating officers within their designated area at the time of a serious CFS. Second, it would allow the department to restructure the beats in a way that balances CFS demands against the resources available. This will help to balance personnel deployments across the sectors. Third, with personnel deployed appropriately within these geographic areas, response times will reduce. Navigating traffic within the city is difficult, even with emergency lights and siren, and locating officers within specified geographic areas will reduce travel time to CFS.

Determining the number of beats and sectors should not be arbitrary. The department should base these on CFS demands and the resources available. The allocation of personnel (identified in Table 31 above), provides sufficient resources to distribute officers into beats within the sectors. If the department adds personnel to patrol (as recommended), this capacity will increase. It is our observation that the department could reduce the number of beats within sectors 1 and 2, to three each. Sector 3 is more complicated because it is roughly twice the size of the other sectors. The department should consider looking at beat adjustments in sector 3, relative to the number of personnel they can deploy with regularity. In any case, we recommend that the department balance the CFS demands within the beat boundaries, and then deploy personnel accordingly.

Like most police departments, APD call takers prioritize calls based on the criticality of the call, in accordance with department policy and procedures. APD protocols provide the following priority definitions:

- Emergency: Priority Response
- Immediate: 5-10 Minute Response
- Prompt: Within 20-30 Minutes
- Delay: Up to 1 Hour

Table 33 below shows the number of CFS in each of the four priority categories, including a small number not included in any category. As Table 33 shows, the most common CFS are those requiring an immediate response; this accounts for almost 55% of all activity.

**TABLE 33: Calls by Priority**

Call Priority	Count of Calls	% of Total
Blank	41	0.10%
DELAY	8,676	21.23%
EMERGENCY	2,993	7.32%
IMMEDIATE	22,388	54.77%
PROMPT	6,775	16.58%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>40,873</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Alexandria PD 2014 CAD data

Table 34 below shows the average response times to each of the call priorities, separated by sector, and shown overall for the department.

**TABLE 34: Response Time by Priority – Call Received to First On-Scene**

Response Type	Response Policy	Time in Hours/Minutes/Seconds			
		Sector 1	Sector 2	Sector 3	All
Blank		0:05:36	0:05:05	0:07:39	0:06:07
Delay	Within 1 Hour	0:42:51	0:38:23	0:36:14	0:39:09
Emergency	Priority Response	0:07:36	0:07:38	0:08:28	0:07:54
Immediate	Within 5-10 Minutes	0:14:32	0:13:21	0:13:45	0:13:53
Prompt	Within 20-30 Minutes	0:27:32	0:25:24	0:23:57	0:25:38
<b>Total Average</b>		<b>0:19:37</b>	<b>0:17:58</b>	<b>0:18:01</b>	<b>0:18:32</b>

It is important to understand that calculating response times can occur in two different manners. Table 34 above, and all of the associated response-time tables in this report, calculate response time from the point dispatch received the call, to the time the first officer arrived on the scene. This represents the actual time from the point the citizen placed the call, to the time the first officer arrived. However, when conducting a

workload analysis, we calculate obligated workload time from the point the officer received the call, to the time the officer finishes the call.

When departments calculate response times, they generally do so considering the first assigned time, to the time the first officer arrived on the scene. Departments use this metric, because this aspect of response time is the one over which they have the most control. The department established the response policies in Table 34 based on this methodology, which removes any lag time between the time a dispatcher received the phone call, and the time the dispatcher assigned that call to an officer. Table 35 below, depicts response totals from the time the officer received the call, to the time he or she arrived on scene. These numbers accurately reflect the actual elapsed time from officer assignment, to arrival. However, they do not include lag time associated with delays in dispatching, or the time in which CFS are queued awaiting assignment. In comparing the data in Tables 34 and 35, there are significant variances in the overall totals.

**TABLE 35: Response Time by Priority – First Assigned to First On-Scene**

Priority	In-Beat	Out of Beat	Averages
Blank	0:06:49	0:04:20	0:04:53
Delay	0:11:55	0:12:02	0:11:59
Emergency	0:03:56	0:03:57	0:03:57
Immediate	0:07:00	0:07:44	0:07:30
Prompt	0:10:17	0:11:12	0:10:52
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>0:08:48</b>	<b>0:08:45</b>	<b>0:08:46</b>

\*Excludes CFS with a zero response time

\*\*Includes only patrol personnel CFS

Again, in our analysis and representation of these data, we examine call for service response times inclusive of the time between the initial call, and the time dispatch assigned it to an officer. Although both perspectives have value, we provide our analysis here using the full response time from point of call receipt, until the arrival of the first officer.

Overall, for CFS categorized as either delay or prompt, the department appears to be meeting objectives. However, for immediate CFS, the department is averaging about 14 minutes for response, which is 4 minutes beyond the department’s standard, and for CFS requiring an emergency response, the average is about 8 minutes (again, this includes the time from the point of the initial call at the communications center). The average response time for priority CFS among the benchmark cities, from point of dispatch to first officer arrival, is 5.36 minutes.<sup>4</sup> The APD response time for priority

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.opkansas.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/benchmark-city-survey-section-b-general.pdf>

CFS from first dispatched to first arrived, as depicted in Table 35, is 3 minutes and 57 seconds, which is consistent with, and actually below, the benchmark averages. This number may vary slightly from other internal calculations, due to our methodology, and the manner in which we refined the data in CAD, from which we made these determinations.

To understand *overall* response times better, we also looked at response times by sector, by category, and by hour of the day. There are numerous figures associated with this analysis, which for space purposes we have included in Appendix A; see Figures 20-35. We summarize some of the notable observations below:

- Sector 1 – Emergency Priority
  - Between 8-10 AM and 2-5 PM, response times are well over 8 minutes.
- Sector 1 – Immediate Priority
  - Between 3-7 PM, response times are in the 15-20 minute range. Additionally, response times are between 11-15 minutes at a minimum, for nearly every hour of the day.
- Sector 1 – Prompt Priority
  - Between 5-8 AM, typical responses were 28 minutes.
  - Between 1-7 PM, response times ranged from 28-43 minutes.
- Sector 2 – Emergency Priority
  - Between 10 PM to 1 AM, response times are 9-10 minutes.
  - Between 8-9 AM, response times are 10-12 minutes.
  - Between 4-6 PM, response times are 7-9 minutes.
- Sector 2 – Immediate Priority
  - Response times are over 10 minutes for every hour of the day.
  - Between 6-8 AM, response times are 15 minutes.
  - Between 3-6 PM, response times range from 14-20 minutes.
- Sector 2 – Prompt Priority
  - Between 2-5 PM, response times were 30-35 minutes.
- Sector 3 – Emergency Priority
  - Between 4-11 PM, response times over 10 minutes are common.
  - For most hours of the day, a 7-9 minute response is typical.
- Sector 3 – Immediate Priority
  - For most of the hours of the day, the response times are 11-14 minutes.
- Sector 3 – Prompt Priority
  - Response times in this category ranged from 15-30 minutes, which is acceptable, based on APD standards.

In examining the response times by sector, by priority, and by hour, it is apparent that there is incongruity between personnel allocations and work demand, particularly during certain times of the day. It is also evident that the longer response times mirror

the CFS demands expressed by hour of the day, shown in Figure 8. However, simply put, the longer response times suggest that staffing is not keeping up with CFS demands. These data also suggest the need for allocation of additional personnel, shifts to personnel assignments in terms of time of day, and changes to personnel assignments within the sectors. Although we did not examine 2015 CAD data, and the AVL system was not in effect in 2014, we have noted in other agencies that pulling cars from one beat to another with an AVL system often elongates response times in other areas. Again, as noted previously, we believe that a revised beat system, and allocation of multiple resources per beat, would improve this condition, and actually improve the functionality of the AVL system.

### Cover Cars (Back Up)

Within the CAD system at APD, there is not a specific distinction between the primary unit on a call, and other units responding as backup or support. Part of our data analysis included looking at the amount of time spent on calls by the primary unit, and the cumulative amount of time spent on the call by additional units, we have presented these data in Table 36 below (all patrol units are one-officer units).

**TABLE 36: Back-Up Response**

Unit	Hours
Primary Unit	44214:00:27
Back-Up Unit(s)	32418:53:25
<b>Totals</b>	<b>76632:53:52</b>

Source: APD CAD Data 2014

In order to calculate these data, we examined the CAD data for the unit that was first on-scene, and then subtracted all of that time from the total time for the CFS. It is possible that, in some cases, the first unit arriving on scene did not handle the CFS as the primary unit. However, even if this occurred at times, we would not expect this to be a significant variant in the data. Given the numbers provided in Table 36 above, 42.4% of the workload within patrol relates to backup. This is a significant portion of the workload, which may or may not be necessary. Although unit backup is important, over-response to CFS is common among police agencies, and some portion of this obligated time may emanate from over-response. Based on our analysis and our observations throughout the study, it appears this may be an issue in need of additional focus and effort at APD. Accordingly, we recommend continued monitoring of this issue and a reemphasis for supervisors of their role in monitoring officer response.

In addition to looking at the amount of time spent on CFS between primary and backup units, we also looked at which CFS included multiple-unit responses; we have included these data in Table 37 below. We examined APDs response protocols, which provide

direction to the communication center concerning which CFS should include a multiple-unit response.

We found these protocols to be thorough, and did not find any reason to question the response recommendations. However, Table 37 below suggests that the overall average number of responding units is 2.2, encompassing all CFS. This number is somewhat understandable, because, alarms and motor vehicle crashes, which are responsible for a substantial portion of APDs work volume, require two officers for each incident. Still, not every call requires a response by multiple officers. Accordingly, it may be helpful to examine back-up response and the overall response plan, to determine whether the department needs to make procedural or cultural adjustments.

**TABLE 37: Call Types Averaging More Than Two Responding Units, 2014**

<b>Event Type</b>	<b>Count of Events</b>	<b>Average # Responding Units*</b>
CARJACKING	4	12.5
BOMB THREAT	1	8.0
ROBBERY	160	6.8
ASSAULT AGGRAVATED	34	6.4
SUICIDE	317	4.5
WEAPON VIOLATION	284	4.5
FIGHT	375	4.4
ABDUCTION-KIDNAPPING	13	4.1
BURGLARY	533	3.9
PROWLER-PEEPING TOM	11	3.9
TROUBLE UNKNOWN	992	3.3
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS UNKNOWN	235	3.3
ARSON	4	3.3
MENTAL HEALTH CASE	277	3.2
ACCIDENT PERSONAL INJURY	405	3.0
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	2313	2.9
ACCIDENT HIT AND RUN INJURY	24	2.9
MISSING PERSON	322	2.8
ASSIST FIRE/MEDICS	785	2.7
SEXUAL OFFENSE	146	2.7
DRUNK/INTOXICATED SUBJECT	540	2.7
SUBJECT STOP	19	2.6
ASSAULT SIMPLE	360	2.6
DISORDERLY CONDUCT	4252	2.5
SHOPLIFTING	251	2.4
ASSIST OUTSIDE AGENCY	429	2.4
LOUD PARTY	169	2.4
ALARM	4657	2.3
SUSPICIOUS EVENT	3202	2.3
E911 911 HANG UP	653	2.2
DRUG COMPLAINT	832	2.2
TRESPASSING	472	2.1
PUBLIC SERVICE	397	2.1
NOISE VIOLATION	1954	2.1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>40873</b>	<b>2.2</b>

Source: Alexandria PD 2014 CAD data

\*Including primary unit

## SECTION II: OFFICER AVAILABILITY

Police patrol staffing requirements are determined by evaluating the total workload in hours against hours of officer availability. Officers are not able to work for a variety of reasons including days off, vacation, sick leave, holiday time, and training obligations. To define staffing needs, deploy officers properly, and evaluate productivity, it is necessary to calculate the actual amount of time officers are available to work. We obtained leave data from APD (average hours used by patrol and investigations in 2014). Using these data, we constructed Table 38 below, which outlines average leave times, and shows the amount of available hours per patrol officer per year.

**TABLE 38: Patrol Availability (Hours)**

<b>Annual hours worked</b>	<b>2080</b>
<i>Leave Category</i>	
PTO	-133
Extended Sick	-65
Holiday	-88
Leave Without Pay	-1
Military	-3
Injury	-8
Comp Time	-67
Mandatory training*	-20
Other training*	-49
<b>Average Annual Availability (hours)</b>	<b>1646</b>

These figures are averages based on actual leave times for all patrol officers in 2014.

\*Training hours listed here are likely low, due to inaccurate training records.

In summary, this table shows that patrol officers have 1,646 hours of available work time each year. This figure is very important in terms of determining staffing needs, because it represents the actual time available, as opposed to 2,080 hours of paid time per person, which managers often use as a benchmark for scheduling purposes.

There are some other aspects of this total that are worthy of mention. The training hours shown here total 69 hours (cumulative of mandatory and other training). In our examination of the department's training records, we found countless examples of training record entries, which included no recorded hours for the officer. In some cases, it may be that the officer signed up for the training and did not attend. More likely, based on our discussion and observations, officers attended, but the record keeping was inadequate. This is a concern for two reasons. First, the training records for the officers are likely incomplete and inaccurate, which could present legal problems later. Second, the hours above likely do not represent an accurate total average, which makes accurate assessments of available time difficult. To illustrate the potential shortage of training

hours reflected in Table 38, among the benchmark cities, the total average for 2014 is 110.2 training hours.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to questions regarding the total training hours, we also note that the average sick leave among patrol officers is 65 hours. This number is high, relatively, given that it is an average. Table 38 also outlines COMP time usage at 67 hours per officer. This number may be the result of overtime, or it may be the result of officers converting holidays into COMP time. Research shows that 12-hour schedules have a higher level of overtime and sick leave use associated with them. Based on our limited analysis, we cannot draw a correlation between the work schedule and these areas; however, given the concerns raised by APD staff regarding the functionality of the work schedule, and the relatively high number of hours in these two areas, we recommend further analysis of this issue by APD.

### **Shift Relief Factor**

To calculate the shift relief factor, we used the average availability for each officer displayed in Table 38. The shift relief factor is the number of officers required to staff one shift position every day of the year. For the Patrol Division, one position requires 4,380 hours per year to staff (12 hours X 365 days = 4,380 hours). Therefore, the shift relief factor is calculated to be 2.66 ( $4,380/1646 = 2.66$ ). To determine the shift relief factor for one position over a 24-hour period, we multiplied this number times two. Therefore, the daily shift relief factor is 5.32 for each position. It is important to note that this calculation represents the number of personnel needed to staff one position. It does not represent the number of personnel needed to respond adequately to workload demands.

Understanding the shift relief factor is important from a scheduling standpoint. Police agencies tend to complete their work schedule based on the total number of personnel available, as opposed to the workload capacity of those personnel. The result is an imbalance between the structure of the schedule, and the number of hours officers can actually work.

To determine the proper number of officers required for patrol, agencies must first consider how many positions they want to staff at any given time. Once the department determines this number, they can calculate personnel needs. For example, if APD wanted to staff five positions in a sector for both shifts (AM and PM), it would require 27 (26.6) officers ( $5.32 \times 5$ ). For three sectors, this number shifts to 81.

---

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.opkansas.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/benchmark-city-survey-section-b-general.pdf>

**TABLE 31 (repeated): Patrol Officer Allocations by Shift and Sector**

	Sector 1	Sector 2	Sector 3	Totals
Days A	8	6	13	27
Nights A	9	5	11	25
Days B	8	7	10	25
Nights B	9	6	12	27
Power*			9	9
<b>Totals</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>Pct. of Officers</b>	<b>30.09%</b>	<b>21.24%</b>	<b>48.67%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Note: Excludes supervisors

Table 31 above (repeated) shows the current staffing allocations at APD. Using the numbers allocated for each sector, we can calculate the staffing needs as follows:

- Sector 1: For eight positions, day or night, the department would need 43 officers (42.56).
- Sector 2: For six positions, day or night, the department would need 32 officers (31.92).
- Sector 3: For eleven positions, day or night, the department would need 59 officers (58.52).
- Power Shift: To staff nine power shifts, the department would need 12 officers (40 hours per week x 52 weeks = 2,080 hours, divided by 1646 = 11.34).

Using these numbers, APD would require 146 officers assigned to patrol to cover minimum shifts of eight in sector 1, six in sector 2, and 11 in sector 3, plus 9 power shift officers. We are providing these calculations as an example, not as a recommendation. As we have noted, the department must make personnel allocations based on workload and on time of day. This example presumes equal distribution of personnel, which would likely not serve the peak-call-volume needs of the department.

**TABLE 39: Population and Calls for Service – 100,000 to 250,000 Population;  
Benchmark City Survey – 2014 Data**

Benchmark City	Population	Total Calls for Service	Officers in Patrol	CFS Per Officer in Patrol
Bellevue, WA	134,400	51,493	89	578.57
Boise, ID	217,730	75,613	184	410.94
Boulder, CO	103,163	59,341	117	507.19
Broken Arrow, OK	105,000	33,137	76	436.01
Cedar Rapids, IA	128,642	84,789	121	700.74
Chesapeake, VA	228,513	131,305	224	586.18
Columbia, MO	117,381	77,905	94	828.78
Coral Springs, FL	121,096	72,460	105	690.10
Fort Collins, CO	155,400	60,344	94	641.96
Fremont, CA	220,000	78,497	119	659.64
Garland, TX	233,206	143,028	152	940.97
Grand Prairie, TX	183,816	103,251	144	717.02
Irving, TX	227,030	122,806	162	758.06
Lakewood, CO	147,220	68,130	154	442.40
Naperville, IL	143,289	36,367	100	363.67
Norman, OK	117,520	63,368	113	560.78
Olathe, KS	132,437	40,344	105	384.23
Overland Park, KS	184,706	60,296	108	558.30
Peoria, AZ	164,825	51,478	122	421.95
Richardson, TX	101,820	56,305	85	662.41
San Angelo, TX	100,111	54,029	89	607.07
Springfield, MO	164,560	87,765	180	487.58
<b>Totals</b>	<b>155,994</b>	<b>73,275</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>588.98</b>

<b>Alexandria, VA</b>	<b>148,692</b>	<b>49,141</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>434.88</b>
<b>*Adjusted Total</b>			<b>89</b>	<b>552.15</b>

Source for benchmark data: <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>  
NOTE: Calls for service includes only calls where someone telephoned to request police response. This does not include officer-initiated calls.

Table 39 above shows the breakdown of CFS per officer assigned to patrol and it compares APD to the benchmark cities. The average number of CFS handled in the benchmark cities is approximately 589. For APD, based on 113 personnel, the number is about 435. However, factoring in the *lost hours* for patrol, the department has the equivalent of 89 officers staffing the patrol division (assuming no vacancies). When this number is used, the average CFS per officer at APD is 552.15, which is very similar to the average of the benchmark cities.

### SECTION III: PATROL WORKLOAD VS. AVAILABILITY

Measurement standards make it possible to evaluate and define patrol staffing and deployment requirements. The primary standards employed for the APD study follow:

- Operational labor
- Administrative labor
- Uncommitted time

#### Operational Labor

Operational labor is the aggregate amount of time consumed by patrol officers to answer calls for service generated by the public and to address on-view situations discovered and encountered by officers. It is the total of criminal, non-criminal, traffic, and back-up activity initiated by a call from the public, or an incident an officer comes upon. Expressed, as a percentage of the total labor in an officer’s workday, operational labor of first response patrol officers should not continuously exceed 30%. Table 40 below provides an overview of how the workload obligation is calculated.

**TABLE 40: Obligated Workload – Patrol 30% Model**

	<b>Literal Explanation and Formula</b>	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>
A	Total Patrol Unit Obligated Hours - Citizen CFS (includes backup)	62,164.00	64,277.00
B	Available Hours per Officer	1,646.00	1,646.00
C	Authorized Strength in Patrol	113.00	113.00
D	Current Patrol Hours Available (B*C)	185,998.00	185,998.00
E	Current % Obligated to Citizen CFS (A/D)	<b>33.42%</b>	<b>34.56%</b>
F	Target Obligated Workload (30%)	30.00%	30.00%
G	Officer Workload Hours Available at 30% (B*F)	493.80	493.80
H	Patrol Officers Required to Meet Target Workload (A/G)	125.89	130.17
	<b>Additional Primary CFS Response Officers Needed (H minus C)</b>	<b>12.89</b>	<b>17.17</b>

With 113 authorized officers assigned to patrol, total available time for APD first responders for the year is 185,998 hours (113 officers x 1,646 average hours of availability per officer). Operational labor, as evidenced by 2014 CAD activity, accounted for a total of 62,164 hours under model 1 (which excludes officers who arrived on-scene more than 30 minutes after the call), and 64,277 hours in model 2 (which excludes officers arriving on-scene more than 60 minutes after the call). The

current operational requirement of 62,164 represents 33.42% of the current patrol availability in model 1, and the 64,277 represents 34.56% of the current patrol availability in model 2, both of which exceed the IACP recommended target of 30%; see Table 40 above).

Based on these calculations, APD would need to add 18 officers (under model 2) to reduce the obligated workload to 30%. It is also important to note that when the obligated workload exceeds 30%, a similar shift typically occurs to the administrative labor calculation. This is because additional obligated workload generally means that the officer will have administrative labor associated with that work.

As part of our study, we asked officers to complete a worksheet and survey related to CFS they handled during two of their work shifts (we did not identify which shifts to record). The results, shown in Table 41 below, show that officers handled 716 CFS, with an average of 6.6 CFS per shift, each averaging 53 minutes. This self-reported data does not include report-writing time, but only includes on-scene time associated with handling the CFS.

**TABLE 41: Officer Workload Survey Results - CFS**

Title	Number
Number of Responses	117
Number of CFS Reported	716
Average CFS per Shift	6.6
Average Minutes per CFS	53

These data are important to consider as part of the workload analysis. Based on our analysis of the CFS records in CAD, the average time spent on a non-report CFS was about 55 minutes (see Table 22 above). This is very consistent and suggests reliability in the self-reported data from the officers. Using these data, we calculated 6.6 CFS per shift, with an average of 53 minutes each, resulting in 349.8 minutes of committed time. Using a 12-hour shift as a benchmark, we divided these numbers (720 minutes in a 12-hour shift), and determined that obligated workload accounts for 48.58% of each officer’s shift. If accurate and consistent, this number dramatically exceeds the IACP 30% obligated workload model recommendation.

### **Administrative Labor**


Precise information is not available in CAD for many administrative activities, due to variances in officer *call outs* for these activities. Nevertheless, our interviews and field observations suggest that administrative time appears to be at the norm. We estimate that administrative time generally accounts for approximately 25 – 30% of an officer’s average day, and such appears to be the case in Alexandria. This percentage can seem

high to those not acquainted with the patrol function. However, a review of patrol activities supports this average.

- Report-writing and case follow up (variable)
- Patrol Briefings - 15 minutes
- Administrative preparation/report checkout - 30 minutes
- Meal and personal care breaks - 30 minutes
- Court attendance (dayshift)
- On duty training, not otherwise captured
- Vehicle maintenance and fueling (15 minutes per day)
- Meetings with supervisors (variable)
- Special administrative assignments (variable)
- Personnel/payroll activities (health fairs, paperwork review and paperwork training (variable)
- Field Training Officer (FTO) time for both trainee and trainer (variable); on-duty training for officers
- Equipment maintenance (computer, weapons, radio). (variable)

In order to attempt to illustrate allocations of administrative time that are unaccounted for in CAD, we asked the patrol officers to complete a worksheet and survey during two of their patrol shifts. We asked officers to record time spent on certain activities and to report this back to us via an online survey. We received 117 responses, and we have provided the results of the survey data in Figure 9 below.

**Figure 9: Self-Reported Supplemental Workload - 2014**



The average time reported for supplemental work by each officer, for each shift, was 54 minutes. This does not include reports associated with CFS. It is also noteworthy that this survey spanned only two of the officer's normal shifts (we did not identify which shifts to use). While representative of the supplemental workload, we suspect that it reflects the minimal amount of per shift load, and that a longer period of analysis would demonstrate a higher amount of time on average, allocated in this area. We encourage the APD to continually survey patrol personnel to monitor this activity.

### **Uncommitted Time**

The cumulative operational and administrative labor that officers must engage, should not be so significant that they are unable to respond to emergencies in a timely fashion or engage in mission-critical elective activities and problem solving efforts. A proportion of the workday must be uncommitted to any other type of labor. Uncommitted time allows officers to do the following:

- To have and initiate public-service contacts
- To participate in elective activities selected by the agency, such as community policing and problem solving
- To make pedestrian and business contacts
- To conduct field interviews

- To engage proactive traffic stops and proactive patrol efforts.

Uncommitted time is the time left over after officers complete the work associated with both obligated/committed time and administrative time.

A general principle for distribution of time for patrol is 30% across the board for administrative, operational, and uncommitted time with a 10% flex factor. Ideally, particularly for service-driven organizations, the remaining 10% becomes uncommitted time, allowing officers more time for proactive community engagement. For a jurisdiction the size of Alexandria, and with its stated focus on exceptional service and community policing, no less than 40% uncommitted patrol time is ideal.

## **SECTION IV: RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Primary Recommendation**

#### ***Recommendation: Augment Patrol Staffing***

The current level of obligated workload for patrol officers (33.42%-34.56%) exceeds the 30% obligated workload target established in the IACP model. In order to achieve a 30% obligated time ratio, APD should add 13-18 additional personnel to the patrol function. While this recommendation includes a range that emanates from two analytical models, adding 18 officers to patrol (the higher range) would result in 43.09% of the current APD workforce assigned to patrol, which would still be well below the average percentage of officers assigned to patrol (56.48%) among the respondents in the benchmark cities survey, see Table 42 below.<sup>6</sup> We advocate for increasing the patrol unit by the larger of these numbers.

---

<sup>6</sup> see <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>

**TABLE 42: Patrol and Investigation Assignment Comparisons to Benchmark City**  
**Survey - 2014 data**

Benchmark Cities	Total Officers	Assigned to Patrol	Percent of Officers	Assigned to Investigation	Percent of Officers
Bellevue, WA	178	89	50.00%	23	12.92%
Boca Raton, FL	198	120	60.61%	23	11.62%
Boise, ID	301	184	61.13%	37	12.29%
Boulder, CO	178	117	65.73%	21	11.80%
Broken Arrow, OK	130	76	58.46%	13	10.00%
Cedar Rapids, IA	206	121	58.74%	27	13.11%
Chesapeake, VA	387	224	57.88%	44	11.37%
Chula Vista, CA	237	134	56.54%	23	9.70%
Columbia, MO	163	94	57.67%	19	11.66%
Coral Springs, FL	208	105	50.48%	24	11.54%
Edmond, OK	120	68	56.67%	13	10.83%
Fort Collins, CO	198	94	47.47%	34	17.17%
Fremont, CA	188	119	63.30%	23	12.23%
Garland, TX	323	152	47.06%	43	13.31%
Grand Prairie, TX	259	144	55.60%	36	13.90%
Henderson, NV	389	174	44.73%	48	12.34%
Irving, TX	346	162	46.82%	46	13.29%
Lakewood, CO	258	154	59.69%	51	19.77%
Lawrence, KS	154	97	62.99%	19	12.34%
Lincoln, NE	320	211	65.94%	39	12.19%
Naperville, IL	168	100	59.52%	26	15.48%
Norman, OK	175	113	64.57%	22	12.57%
Olathe, KS	173	105	60.69%	17	9.83%
Overland Park, KS	250	108	43.20%	31	12.40%
Peoria, AZ	191	122	63.87%	26	13.61%
Plano, TX	356	192	53.93%	55	15.45%
Richardson, TX	151	85	56.29%	28	18.54%
San Angelo, TX	165	89	53.94%	24	14.55%
Springfield, MO	331	180	54.38%	52	15.71%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>6701</b>	<b>3733</b>	<b>56.48%</b>	<b>30.59</b>	<b>13.16%</b>

<b>Alexandria, VA</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>37.17%</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>14.80%</b>
-----------------------	------------	------------	---------------	-----------	---------------

Source for benchmark data: <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>

NOTE: Patrol excludes specialty assignments (e.g. K-9, Traffic) and division commanders.

It is our overall assessment that closing the workload to work capacity gap will allow officers to serve the community better. This means that officers will have more time to spend on CFS when warranted (such as D/V cases), and it means that officers will have more time to dedicate to community policing efforts. This is particularly true at this critical juncture in policing in America.

We have recommend, and believe there is a need to augment the patrol division. However, additional department actions can further reduce the burden on patrol offices, enhancing their effectiveness in the process. These include improvements to the TRU, and encouraging its use by the public, and improving and expanding the use of online reporting. Additionally, as noted below, we recommend adjustments to the purpose of the motors unit. In aggregate, these recommendations will reduce obligated demands on patrol, and the combination of these efforts will improve officer outputs.

Table 43 below shows the workload, broken down by patrol and non-patrol functions. The patrol officers, patrol sergeants, and the community support units, combine to engage 74,264 hours of work effort. This equates to 96.9% of all the obligated CFS volume for the agency. Several other units purport to assist in the CFS function, and certainly many perform a vital role. However, their combined work effort is minimal (against the obligated workload) in comparison to the burden of the patrol division. Our recommendations would shift portions of that burden, and add personnel to the patrol division to reduce individual obligated workloads.

**TABLE 43: Patrol vs. Non-Patrol Workload**

<b>Patrol Unit Category</b>	<b>(Time) HH:MM:SS</b>
Patrol	69525:27:55
Patrol Sgt.	2519:07:59
Community Support	2220:26:07
K9	776:56:04
Off Duty detail	678:06:31
Commander	291:09:37
Motor Unit	143:31:38
Patrol (Admin Duty)	243:34:14
Community Support Sgt.	106:41:44
Captain	37:05:37
School Sgt.	25:55:29
Motor Sgt.	27:30:22
Ops Sgt.	15:27:49
Ops Lt	15:21:32
TRU	1:04:30
Parking Sgt.	0:44:23
Traffic Lt	0:36:24
Traffic Capt.	3:22:07
Ops Capt.	2:21:43
Community Relations Officer	0:26:37
<b>Sub-Totals</b>	<b>76633:58:22</b>
<b>Non-Patrol Data</b>	
CSI	1664:39:29
Investigations	1366:41:59
Miscellaneous (Sheriff, Radar, Community College, Animal Control).	392:35:36
SRO	781:32:08
Parking Officers	248:25:05
DUI Detail	157:50:20
Anti-Crime	45:57:43
DV Detectives	35:24:11
School Xing Supervisor	6:42:33
<b>Sub-Totals</b>	<b>4699:49:04</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>81333:47:26</b>

Source: APD CAD Data 2014

### ***Recommendation: Prioritize Patrol Staffing***

The core function of any police agency is the patrol division. Despite this, when vacancies occur, these often result in reductions to the patrol operation. This works against the capability of the organization to maintain a stable patrol workforce, resulting in service reductions. It also affects the capacity of patrol personnel to perform supplemental duties and community policing activities. The department should take a position that all patrol assignments are *essential*, backfilling any vacancies in patrol from less-essential roles (as determined by the department) within the organization (excluding investigations – see below).

This recommendation builds upon the first recommendation, and though it may seem logical and intuitive to adopt this practice, this is not the case in many police agencies, and it has not been the norm at APD. The objective in adding personnel to patrol is to ensure proper staffing. The staffing recommendations we have offered represent what we believe to be the minimal staffing to ensure workload obligations remain at or below 30%.

### ***Recommendation: Establish Minimum Patrol Staffing***

A safe and effective patrol workforce is essential to maintaining a safe community. To ensure that officers are safe and effective, and to ensure that service levels are met, the department should establish minimum shift coverages that correlate with the staffing recommendations of this study, and maintain these levels consistently.

As we have discussed, there is a need to supplement staffing in the patrol division, and other efforts to reduce the work burden for patrol will improve the functionality of that division. In addition, we have examined CFS totals by sector, beat, day of the week, and by hour. It is evident that the department needs to make adjustments to personnel deployments to meet operational needs. Once the department establishes these minimal levels, they must become a standard. Setting this standard involves a commitment to temporary reassignment of personnel, or using overtime for to fill any gaps. This will ensure continuity of patrol operations, and the ability of patrol officers to engage in proactive projects, and not allowing obligated workload time to jeopardize them.

### ***Recommendation: Reemphasize Community Policing as a Department Strategy***

Officers within the APD know that community policing is an organizational philosophy, however, lack of available time has been a convenient and understandable excuse for patrol personnel to conduct minimal, if any, meaningful community policing work. The recommendations above (and others within the report) if carried out, will distribute obligated patrol work in such a way that officers will have sufficient time to engage the community-policing model. The department will need to reemphasize its

expectations for officers in this regard, that community policing is an organizational philosophy, not one relegated to a particular unit (e.g. COPS unit), and then implement strategies to ensure this philosophy translates into practice.

When community policing is a philosophy, officers recognize this, but they may not operationalize this into their efforts. Numerous officers told us that they did not have time to engage in community policing, and based on our complete assessment, this is largely true. More troubling, however, was the constant sense from officers that *community policing* is something that the COP unit does. There are benefits in having a COP unit in a police agency, and indeed, we were impressed with the efforts of the COP unit at APD. Still, their presence suggests that *only* the COP unit is responsible for COP within the agency. As the department emphasizes their COP efforts organization-wide, we recommend that the COP unit more actively engage and support collaboratively those officers working on community policing efforts within the sectors and beats.

### ***Recommendation: Re-emphasize a Beat-Structured Patrol Response***

The APD has stated and demonstrated its commitment to a community oriented policing strategy. Such a philosophy requires that officers have sufficient time to engage in community policing in a meaningful way, and it requires that officers have a connection to the community they are serving. This is critical so that they can establish relationships with those they serve, and so that they can recognize and understand problems and issues that require attention.

The use of the automated vehicle locator (AVL) system for dispatching priority CFS, and the ensuing philosophy adopted upon its implementation, along with personnel shortages, have reduced the effectiveness of and adherence to the beat structured deployment of personnel within the sectors, resulting in a lack of service continuity by officers in specific geographic areas. We advocate the use of a beat deployment system that encourages and emphasizes geographically structured policing and dispatching, such that officers can develop familiarity with their particular beat, allowing them to establish relationships and to develop collaborative community partnerships and community policing actions. We believe that AVL systems have significant utility. With adjustments to the beat structure, including size, geographic boundaries, and proper staffing, we believe that the AVL system will more often than not, locate personnel available for assignment to CFS within their designated patrol area.

As we mentioned previously, it appears that the department would benefit from a restructuring of the beats, and perhaps even the sectors. Ultimately, we feel that assigning officers to geographical segments within the city provides several benefits. It provides an opportunity for officers to learn the area and the people, improving their ability to detect crime. It provides opportunities for officers to develop relationships with those in their assigned area, and it helps them to become familiar with the

problems that portion of the community is facing. In turn, this leads to a better capacity to identify and work on those problems in a meaningful way.

We are aware of the department's philosophy regarding hot-spot patrols, and we applaud this. Agencies should engage data analytics in personnel deployments. However, hot-spots change, and this means that the officers assigned to patrol those areas move to another location. This works against the concepts of continuity and relationship building, which are central to the community policing strategy. Accordingly, we recommend a re-focused utilization of a beat structure system to accommodate these practices.

## **Secondary Recommendations**

### ***Recommendation: Reduce Operational Vacancies***

The APD has lost an average of 27 officers per year since 2010, and this number has been trending upward. Although the city recently made a significant investment in the police salary structure to balance officer pay relative to neighboring jurisdictions, in recent years, the number of vacancies has exceeded 10% of the APD sworn workforce (35 vacancies in 2014). This vacancy rate has affected all operational areas within the department, most notably the patrol and investigation bureaus. The lengthy hiring and training process, which can run 15-18 months, complicates this problem. To correct for this issue, we recommend the following:

1. APD should seek authorization from the city for over-hires, effectively hiring personnel in advance of any anticipated vacancies. Given the attrition trend, we would recommend a minimum of 25 over-hires. This would allow the department to backfill positions in real-time, and would reduce the operational impact of separations. If the attrition rate declines, the city could reduce the number of authorized over-hires.
2. APD should continue to engage and maintain an aggressive and ongoing recruiting and hiring process, continually accepting applications and promptly vetting them for potential hire. Losing 10% or more of the department's workforce has a substantial impact, particularly when these vacancies come from critical operational units such as patrol and investigations. Implementation of an ongoing continuous application process for new hires, with regular cut-off dates for processing, can help reduce the loss of personnel.

***Recommendation: Increase the Staffing, and Volume and Types of Incidents Handled by Telephone Reporting Unit and Through Online Reporting.***

Although APD currently has a Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU), the department currently allocates only 1.5 Full-Time Equivalent (FTEs) to it. Reportedly, those on light duty occasionally staff this unit. We recommend increasing the staffing of this unit to ensure that it is available for day and evening CFS needs. Staffing could come from non-sworn personnel, or volunteers. Despite ready access to officers on light duty, we would recommend staffing the TRU with other personnel for two reasons. First, the department needs to staff fully the TRU, regardless of the availability of officers on light duty. Second, using sworn personnel for this unit works against the concept of the cost-savings associated with a TRU.

The TRU already handles a modest number of calls, but APD should expand the current activity of the TRU to include more cold crime and property damage (crash) reporting, and other calls that do not require officer response to a scene. APD could create additional efficiency in patrol by more aggressively diverting qualified calls to the TRU.

In addition to expanding the use and functionality of the TRU, APD should consider more intentional efforts to steer callers toward online reporting (these initiatives may require collaboration with the communications center, and additional training). Like the TRU, online reporting can remove a portion of the work burden from the patrol division, freeing them to handle calls for service that are more pressing, and allowing officers to engage in more proactive community service efforts.

Table 44 below reflects the data for CFS handled by the TRU in 2014. The number of CFS shown here is significant, and if added to the patrol workload, it would be burdensome. In other words, the TRU is already performing an important function. However, there are many CFS listed below for which the TRU could expand its role. Doing so would further reduce the workload burden on patrol.

**TABLE 44: Telephone Response Unit (TRU) Data**

Type of Call	# of Calls
Larceny	475
Accident - Hit and Run Property Damage	373
Property Lost	232
Destruction of Property	210
Telephone Complaint	52
Identity Fraud	46
False Pretenses/Fraud/Swindle	39
Credit Card Fraud	21
Police Information	16
Accident - Property Damage	9
Suspicious Event	5
Traffic Complaint	3
Property Found	3
Grand Larceny Auto	3
Accident - City Property Damage	2
Assist Citizen	2
Accident Hit and Run Injury	2
Disorderly Conduct	2
Warrant Issued	2
Embezzlement	1
Stalking	1
Animal Complaint	1
Parking Complaint	1
Trespassing	1
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1502</b>

Source: Alexandria PD


***Recommendation: Modify the Work Schedule***

Based on our observations and feedback from numerous department members, including patrol officers, and mid- and upper-level supervisors, in its current configuration, the APD work schedule is not providing an appropriate level of functionality. There are significant variances in shift coverage across the sectors; the deployment of personnel does not adequately cover peak demands in calls for service and the use of the power shift over only four days a week leaves a noticeable gap on the remaining three days. Further, the power shift only serves one of the three patrol sectors within the city. In addition, the current schedule does not appear to account for shift vacancies, at times leaving gaps in sectors, and restricting the availability of officers to take leave time.

There are also some unconfirmed indications from our study and analysis that the 12-hour shifts may be contributing to other issues related to sick leave and the generation of comp- and overtime (some external schedule research reports that these are commonalities in 12-hour schedules). We also learned that the schedule design is responsible for a certain amount of *lost hours* for officers related to training. We recommend that the department conduct a thorough analysis of the work schedule to address these concerns.

Our analysis of CFS response also included an examination of the number of officers on duty, compared the CFS demands. Figure 10 below shows the aggregate totals.

**Figure 10: Citywide Average Staffing by Average Citizen CFS, by Hour of Day**



What is immediately evident in looking at this figure is that the personnel deployments do not match CFS demands. This is true across the entire day, with the exception of the hours between 2:00 AM and 6:00 AM, which appear to have adequate coverage.

When we add the power shift to these totals, in aggregate, staffing appears to match more closely the CFS needs, see the dotted line in Figure 10 above. However, it is important to remember that the power shift only works four days a week, and they only work in sector 3.

Figures 11, 12, and 13 below, show the average patrol staffing by hour of the day, by sector, compared to CFS. All of these figures show the *maximum* number of officers scheduled during these times. In reality, the department does not staff at the maximum number of officers, which means that any imbalances reflected here are greater than these figures show.

Several officers and supervisors commented to the IACP team that they felt the 12-hour shifts were too long and that officers were fatigued. The IACP team also learned that APD credits officers on training for a day (eight hours) with twelve hours of pay. When training covers multiple dates, the department pays officers based on the actual hours worked. Although this practice benefits the officers, it contributes to *lost time* for officers; essentially, the agency forfeits these hours. We discourage this practice in the future, and various schedule designs can adjust to pay officers for actual hours worked, instead of paying on a day for a day basis.

**Figure 11: Sector 1 Average Staffing by Average Citizen CFS, by Hour of Day**




Figure 12: Sector 2 Average Staffing by Average Citizen CFS, by Hour of Day





Figure 13: Sector 3 Average Staffing by Average Citizen CFS, by Hour of Day



In addition to the CFS figures we have already referenced, we have also included two *heat maps*. Figure 14 below shows the CFS by hour and day in a heat map format. This heat map progressively highlights times of the day (from green to red) receiving a greater number of CFS. Figure 15 below, provides a similar mapping of CFS, breaking these down by sector, beat, and type of CFS. The department should examine Figures 6 through 15 to assess personnel allocations for the beats and sectors, and by time of day. This assessment should inform the work schedule.

**Figure 14: CFS by Hour of Day - Heat Map**

Hour	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Grand Total
0	330	201	139	159	198	192	306	1525
1	304	137	150	147	171	163	276	1348
2	288	123	109	118	132	154	273	1197
3	210	85	86	73	95	89	210	848
4	146	58	68	77	77	76	126	628
5	139	67	60	66	79	81	86	578
6	88	98	108	102	109	123	100	728
7	98	172	162	183	185	165	112	1077
8	129	213	238	229	235	227	186	1457
9	192	239	220	237	264	285	219	1656
10	222	246	257	244	231	233	237	1670
11	240	253	255	250	247	292	256	1793
12	294	316	277	277	256	269	279	1968
13	264	267	258	286	264	325	303	1967
14	273	293	295	273	285	289	294	2002
15	260	287	293	288	290	340	333	2091
16	230	272	256	343	350	325	298	2074
17	285	337	361	381	399	393	306	2462
18	275	396	395	413	380	397	325	2581
19	288	373	410	347	398	396	365	2577
20	295	321	323	320	368	367	338	2332
21	285	299	312	318	285	375	364	2238
22	277	249	249	306	305	367	389	2142
23	231	233	212	260	241	360	397	1934
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>5643</b>	<b>5535</b>	<b>5493</b>	<b>5697</b>	<b>5844</b>	<b>6283</b>	<b>6378</b>	<b>40873</b>

Source: Alexandria PD 2014 CAD data

Figure 15: CFS Type by Sector and Beat - Heat Map

Event Type	1					2					3					Grand Total			
	12	13	14	11	15	Total	23	25	24	21	22	Total	34	35	36		32	33	31
ALARM	691	287	247	284	208	1677	264	70	303	331	148	1116	600	191	228	329	120	285	1833
DISORDERLY CONDUCT	483	351	321	159	187	1481	209	247	143	104	50	753	503	447	314	351	158	138	2013
SUSPICIOUS EVENT	254	187	184	194	185	1004	131	77	296	257	82	843	290	260	213	200	188	198	1549
ACCIDENT PROPERTY DAMAGE	272	201	156	221	103	933	126	67	107	85	42	427	350	231	365	184	283	226	1639
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	53	86	114	85	69	407	97	158	58	35	28	376	338	401	233	234	136	82	1326
LARCENY	193	157	79	104	83	616	182	57	59	132	57	487	313	189	226	125	198	135	1186
NOISE VIOLATION	100	46	95	66	99	406	83	165	53	73	14	388	224	276	212	171	108	65	1156
ASSIST CITIZEN	98	100	91	63	66	418	77	77	66	54	18	292	229	179	142	189	151	68	958
WARRANT SERVICE	76	358	35	32	14	715	24	38	9	8	4	83	85	65	30	170	29	13	392
TROUBLE UNKNOWN	64	52	67	44	46	273	49	54	34	32	9	178	128	116	100	79	66	50	539
ACCIDENT HIT AND RUN PROPERTY DAMAGE	85	79	32	54	32	282	38	32	39	33	19	161	119	94	105	64	89	38	509
DRUG COMPLAINT	22	38	44	21	28	153	27	31	31	12	2	123	93	183	71	85	75	34	541
ASST FIRE/MEDICS	43	52	50	34	64	243	30	36	39	35	11	151	89	79	68	67	52	35	390
E911 911 HANG UP	57	58	85	43	50	293	19	29	23	50	15	136	54	46	45	24	24	31	224
DESTRUCTION	67	35	38	27	13	180	22	23	32	24	3	106	90	65	44	50	52	33	334
D RUNK/INTOXICATED SUBJECT	83	57	37	15	26	218	30	48	22	12	4	116	50	32	40	36	35	10	203
BURGLARY	36	24	28	28	32	148	14	29	30	43	13	129	50	59	36	41	32	37	253
DISABLED MOTORIST	21	50	10	49	19	149	11	4	17	10	6	48	52	36	67	21	48	78	302
HAZARD	41	23	28	58	24	174	20	6	27	31	10	114	31	13	44	36	42	35	201
TRESPASSING	49	36	83	7	38	213	12	26	11	8	3	60	82	43	17	18	19	18	197
PROPERTY FOUND	88	41	26	25	15	195	17	4	16	25	12	74	41	20	21	45	37	18	182
GRAND LARCENY AUTO	32	22	12	26	12	104	20	21	17	10	6	74	78	63	48	21	32	12	254
ALCOHOL OFFENSE	42	22	37	8	24	133	23	110	7	6	1	147	29	70	13	18	13	8	151
ASSIST OUTSIDE AGENCY	15	24	15	15	23	92	19	32	18	10	6	85	54	56	45	27	34	14	230
ACCIDENT PERSONAL INJURY	32	27	30	30	11	130	18	12	10	14	3	57	58	32	36	32	31	29	218
PUBLIC SERVICE	11	21	12	27	21	92	17	12	21	16	7	73	55	36	44	47	33	16	231
RUNAWAY	5	5	28	2	8	48	11	45	7	8		71	127	65	13	36	28	7	276
FIGHT	31	21	61	9	9	131	20	34	9	5		68	49	28	30	33	32	4	176
ASSAULT SIMPLE	33	24	21	9	18	103	18	24	10	13	1	66	42	37	28	33	32	16	188
MISSING PERSON	10	14	8	11	5	48	8	16	17	5	4	50	65	40	23	37	37	21	223
SUICIDE	10	21	18	10	15	74	7	9	27	10	3	56	50	42	39	25	17	12	185
POLICE INFORMATION	7	12	13	7	4	43	9	9	12	22	2	54	37	35	23	69	30	22	216
D RUNK DRIVER	27	13	19	22	11	92	16	15	16	9	8	64	34	20	29	27	19	20	149

Figure 15: CFS Type by Sector and Beat – Heat Map

CFS Type	26	15	13	17	14	85	24	8	12	18	9	71	24	21	33	14	19	22	133	
TRAFFIC COMPLAINT	9	15	32	4	7	67	23	11	17	19	5	75	23	34	24	18	21	21	283	
WEAPON VIOLATION	24	40	34	11	6	115	4	8	12	10	5	39	32	12	22	36	12	9	123	
MENTAL HEALTH CASE	12	13	11	8	5	49	14	16	10	11	3	54	47	30	30	22	20	9	138	
TELEPHONE COMPLAINT	14	1		2	9	26	66		7	1	1	74	23	6	1	7	87	26	250	
SHOW LIFTING	16	19	9	10	2	56	9	5	9	9	5	37	38	32	20	20	25	14	149	
FALSE PRETN/SVNDL/CONFIDENCE GAME	29	24	6	14	8	81	4	7	9	5	3	30	18	12	15	49	19	14	238	
ACCIDENT CITY PROPERTY DAMAGE	19	9	9	10	8	55	12	10	9	6	3	40	23	18	35	14	29	19	138	
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS UNKNOWN	11	9	8	6	5	39	23	2	11	12	2	50	29	12	33	26	12	12	213	
CREDIT CARD FRAUD	5	16	14	8	11	54	8	3	16	15	1	43	26	20	19	20	17	11	113	
IDENTITY FRAUD	7	9	7	2	6	31	7	7	5	7	3	29	33	20	22	11	18	5	109	
LOUD PARTY	7	10	8	7	8	40	11	16	4	5	3	39	20	19	12	7	17	5	159	
ROBBERY	9	5	7	6	9	36	5	11	4	2	1	23	16	21	17	16	9	7	145	
SEXUAL OFFENSE	6	6	8	10	6	36	6	3	3	3	1	16	20	7	18	7	14	15	133	
AGGRESSIVE DRIVER	9	6	6	8	3	32	11		7	4		22	20	15	13	5	6	2	61	
GRAND LARCENY AUTO RECOVERY	29	27	2	6	8	72	4	3	4	2	2	15	1	4	6	4	11	1	27	
SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE/SUBSTANCE	18	9	8		4	39	5	2	1	3	2	13	8	7	6	18	2	3	46	
PROPERTY LOST	2	8	2	4	3	19	7		1	3		11	16	5	8	3	9	1	42	
LOCKOUT	9	2	3	7	1	22		3	3	3	1	7	10	5	5	4	3	2	58	
BAD CHECK/FORGERY																				
PROSTITUTION	3	1			4	8							3	39		2	1		45	
STALKING	1	4	2		1	8	2	1	3	1		7	13	7	2	5	4		31	
TRAFFIC STOP	3	1	3		1	10	4	2	1			7	3	5	2	3	4	2	19	
ASSAULT AGGRAVATED	1	2	4	1		8	4	4	1	2		11	5		3	5	2		34	
EMBEZZLEMENT	3				1	6						6	7	1	2	1	7	1	19	
ESCORT	1	4	2	2	1	10						5	6	3	1	2			13	
ACCIDENT HIT AND RUN INJURY	3	2	2			7		2	2	1		5	4	2	3	1			12	
SUBJECT STOP	1	1	4	1	2	9						2	4	4	2	2	1		7	
ABDUCTION/KIDNAPPING					1	2	1	2	1			4	1	2	3	1			7	
PROWLER-PEEPING TOM			1			1			4			4		4		1	1		6	
PROWLER-PEEPING TOM		2	3			5	1					1							6	
GAMBLING																				
CARJACKING			1	1		2													2	
ARSON					1	1			1			1							2	
IMPERSONATING POLICE OFFICER						1													2	
BOMB THREAT	1				1	1							1						2	
Grand Total	3346	3007	2337	1935	1696	12323	1929	1764	1733	1696	648	7767	4962	3928	3321	3248	3031	2024	20943	
																				40633

### ***Recommendation: Improve the Documentation of Officer Activity***

Any effort to conduct a workload analysis relies on the use of data, whether existing historical data or data created for that explicit purpose. APD, like many departments, must be able to justify all requests for future staffing, and this occurs best through quantification and comparison of workload demand against workforce capacity.

The IACP staffing model relies upon an analysis of obligated work time, which essentially covers the requisite time officers need to respond to a call for service, including the time onsite, but excluding time allocated to report writing and other follow-up (which the IACP model allocates to another segment of workload). The current policy at APD often combines these times in CAD, making it difficult to perform a workload demand calculation. We recommend adjusting the policies related to documentation of officer activity relative to calls for service, including the generation of additional codes to track report time and other notable actions the department wishes to track (e.g. community policing). These adjustments will provide the department with better data to assess the efforts of its officers, but more importantly, they will serve to assist the department in replicating the IACP analysis in the future, should they wish to do so.

We are aware that officers often resist efforts to monitor and/or track their work efforts. Accordingly, APD should be intentional about which items are worth tracking, and consider how officers may react to this. If APD considers additional tracking, we would recommend convening a work group to identify the items worth tracking; this will serve two purposes. First, it will ensure the crating of an intentional list, including those items that are important, and excluding those that are not. Second, a work group of this nature will aid and help create buy-in, and will help ensure that officers (throughout the department) understand the purpose for tracking these items (and that it is not to check up on them).

### ***Recommendation: Augment and Revise the Mission of the Motors Unit***

Motor vehicle crashes within the city are the most frequent activity to which the department responds, accounting for 10.76% of the department's overall activity in 2014.

The motors unit is currently responsible for traffic enforcement, and in particular, for monitoring and enforcing traffic violations in and around the top 10 crash locations within the city. While this is an important function in enhancing traffic safety, this unit does not typically directly respond to calls for service, which is the core function of the APD.

We recommend a revision to the mission of the motors unit to include primary response to motor vehicle crashes. The officers in this unit are already responsible for monitoring the top crash locations within the city, and adding this to their duties is a logical extension of their current responsibilities. Although they would not be exclusively responsible for handling motor vehicle crashes, adding this responsibility would reduce a significant burden from the patrol officers, providing additional time for alternative activities.

Adding this responsibility to the motors unit would require additional personnel. The motors unit currently has 10 officers assigned to it. Assigning three officers in each sector, during an early shift and a power shift, would require eighteen officers. Accordingly, we recommend allocating eight additional officers to this unit. To ensure proper span of control, one of these officers should be a sergeant.

Table 45 below, shows a breakdown of the time spent on various motor vehicle crashes. The time exhausted is over 10,000 hours, which includes back-up officer efforts.

**TABLE 45: Motor Vehicle Crash Response - Time Spent**

<b>Crash Type</b>	<b>Time Spent</b>
City Property Damage	740:24:06
Conditions Unknown	1148:02:34
Hit and Run Property Damage	2045:36:48
Personal Injury	1744:33:09
Property Damage	4432:52:54
<b>Total Hours</b>	<b>10111:29:31</b>

Source: Alexandria PD CAD Data 2014

To put this work effort into perspective, each patrol officer has 493.8 hours of obligated workload available per year. This equates to the total available obligated workload of 20.5 officers.

If the department makes this change, there are potential logistical issues to resolve. It is difficult, if not impossible, to fill out a crash report from a motorcycle. There may also be safety questions about motorcycles protecting crash scenes. The department may wish to consider a combination of motorcycle and standard patrol cruisers for this unit in order to resolve these issues. In addition, even if the motors unit only responded as a primary back-up unit to aid a regular patrol officer who would ultimately write the crash report, this would provide some measure of relief to the workload burden in patrol. To be clear, we are advocating for a more active role for the motors unit, but these issues may require close consideration to determine viable solutions.

***Recommendation: Monitor and Manage Back-Up Unit Response***

The *APD Response Plan* dictates how many one-officer units dispatch should send to individual calls for service. This plan suggests a multiple-officer response on a wide variety of calls, and we find no issues with the suggested protocols. Despite this, many departments tend to over-respond to calls for service, resulting in more personnel on-scene than what the situation requires. Moreover, supervisors who are responsible for monitoring these activities are often lax in reducing over-response, and in releasing personnel from the scene as soon as it is evident that their presence is not required.

There is a lack of data available for us to conclude that officers are over-responding, or that supervisors are not managing resources properly in this regard. Still, our analysis indicates many calls for service with a high unit count. Our analysis also revealed 32,418 hours (42.3% of total workload) in response or on-scene time by back-up units. It is possible that these responses are appropriate. However, overresponse to calls for service is a problem that is pervasive among law enforcement agencies. Based on our analysis and our observations throughout the study, it appears this may be an issue in need of additional focus and effort at APD. Accordingly, we recommend continued monitoring of this issue and a reemphasis for supervisors of their role in monitoring officer response.

APD has a protocol for the dispatching of back-up units. The *APD Response Plan* dictates how many officers dispatch should send to individual calls for service. This plan suggests a multiple-officer response on a wide variety of calls, and we find no issues with the suggested protocols.


**TABLE 36 (repeated): Back-Up Response**

<b>Unit</b>	<b>Hours</b>
Primary Unit	44214:00:27
Back-Up Unit(s)	32418:53:25
<b>Totals</b>	<b>76632:53:52</b>

## CHAPTER IV: INVESTIGATIONS


Criminal investigations are a shared function in the APD. Patrol officers conduct preliminary and some follow-up investigations for minor offenses, while the investigations bureau is primarily responsible for follow-up investigations of more serious offenses. A deputy chief commands the investigations bureau, and there are several sections and units within the bureau; we depict these units and sections in Figure 16 below.

**Figure 16: Investigations Bureau Organizational Structure**




As shown in Figure 16, internal investigations, PIO, and volunteers, each report directly to the deputy chief. A captain oversees the criminal investigation division within the investigations bureau, which has four primary sections. Within the sections, there are various functional units. Figure 17 below, outlines the assignments in the crimes against persons section, Figure 18 shows the assignments in the property crimes section, and Figure 19 depicts the personnel assignments in the vice and narcotics unit.

**Figure 17: Crimes Against Persons Organizational Structure**



**Figure 18: Property Crimes Organizational Structure**





## SECTION I: STAFFING

For evaluative purposes, it is important to describe staffing levels for each section and unit within the investigations bureau. Table 46 below, shows staffing levels for Criminal Investigative Services (CIS), Vice/Narcotics (V/N), Crime Scene Investigations (CSI), Internal Investigations (II), and Public Information and Media Relations (PIO). This table provides an overview of the allocations for these units, but the department has not currently staffed all of these positions.

According to Deputy Chief Huchler, the criminal investigations division has experienced multiple vacancies this past year, which has significantly hampered the number of cases assigned to investigators. The property and crimes against persons sections have operated with five vacancies, and the vice/narcotics unit has been short one person. These vacancies represent about 10% of the workforce allocated to these units.

**TABLE 46: Investigations Bureau Staffing**

	CIS	V/N	CSI	II	PIO		Total
Deputy Chief						1	1
Captain						1	1
Lieutenant	2	1	1				4
Sergeant	4	2	1	2			9
Detective/Investigator	34	12	10				56
PIO					2		2
Computer Forensics	1						1
Youth Coordinator	1						1
Polygraph Examiner	1						1
Admin Support IV	1		1				2
Admin Support II	1						1
Latent Examiner			3				3
Records Clerk			1				1
<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>83</b>

Source: 2015 Alexandria PD Investigations Bureau Workload Assessment

Table 42, provided previously, shows the average percentage of sworn staff allocated to investigations among the benchmark cities. The average is 13.16%, and APD has 14.80% allocated to investigations (not including crime scene investigators). The percentage of sworn staff assigned to investigations at APD is slightly higher than the benchmark average, but it is below percentages we have observed in other studies, which have been in the 20% range. We do not believe that the percentage of personnel assigned to investigations at APD is too high. In fact, we are recommending augmenting further analysis of the vice/narcotics unit, for consideration of additional staff.

Determining staffing within the investigations bureau, and particularly staffing for criminal investigations, is complicated. This is because there are no set standards for determining such staffing levels. Each agency is different, and the myriad variables make it impossible to conduct an agency-to-agency analysis. Instead, our assessment relies on workload and work outputs, and we will examine these further below.

## SECTION II: WORK SCHEDULES

Sworn personnel assigned to the investigations bureau work a variety of shifts. The supervisors generally work 8-hour days. Some detectives in CIS work 8-hour shifts Monday through Friday, and some work 10-hour shifts, with either Monday or Friday off. Crime scene investigators work staggered shifts during the day and middle shift, to provide coverage during peak times of need. Those assigned to vice/narcotics work day- and mid-shifts during weekdays. Based on our analysis and the lack of expressed concerns by detectives or supervisors, this schedule seems to be meeting agency needs. It appears there is a good balance of days on and off, and there is evening coverage, where needed.

Staffing requirements for investigators are determined, in part, by evaluating workload, in hours, against hours of availability. Investigators are not able to work for a variety of reasons including days off, holiday, vacation, sick leave, FMLA time, and training obligations. We received the actual leave data for from the APD for investigations personnel for calendar year 2014. We totaled the leave data for all personnel and totaled each category. The data revealed that investigators worked an average of 1660 hours per year in 2014. Table 47 below displays the calculations used in determining this average.

**TABLE 47: Investigations Availability**

<b>Annual hours worked</b>	<b>2080</b>
<b><i>Leave Category</i></b>	
PTO	-161
Extended Sick	-62
Holiday	-88
Leave Without Pay	-5
Military	-3
Injury	-0
Comp Time	-41
Mandatory training	-20
Other training	-49
<b>Average Annual Availability (hours)</b>	<b>1660</b>

### SECTION III: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

APD has a robust set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the criminal investigation division. The version we received was dated 2009, and revisions may be warranted. We have highlighted a few sections of policy below as they relate to this study.

SOP 1.1 Policy requires a supplemental report within 30 days after case assignment. Thereafter, investigators are required to submit supplemental reports on a schedule established by CIS commanders.

SOP 2.2 Case Management outlines certain rules and responsibilities for investigations. From this policy:

- The first supplemental report is due within 30 days
- Investigators should make every effort to clear out cases within 30 days.
- Supervisor must review any case over 30 days old and determine whether it should remain open or the status should change to *pending*.
- “Serious and/or involved cases will often require more than 30 days to complete. In these cases, the detective shall complete a supplemental every 15 days until the case is pending or closed. The supervisor shall review the open case every 30 days to determine activity and the necessity for keeping the case open. The supervisor shall inform the CIS commander of all cases remaining open 60 days after assignment.”

SOP 2.17 Investigation Audits outlines supervisor rules and responsibilities for conducting case audits. From this policy:

- Supervisors should audit one investigation for each detective quarterly.
- For the audit, the expectation is that supervisors will contact all witnesses and others contacted for the case (excluding suspects), and “make a reasonable attempt to verify all information documented in the detective’s supplements.”
- The policy directs supervisors to submit a memo to the CIS commander by the 20<sup>th</sup> of each month.

SOP 2.20 Minimum Staffing Levels/Leave and Vacation outlines certain rules and staffing levels for investigations. This policy requires eight detectives and one supervisor for the dayshift, and two detectives for the night shift.

SOPs 1.1 and 2.2 both outline expectations for case closures, and both identify 30 days as an expectation. It is helpful to have standards of this nature, and the oversight for cases that exceed 30 days is a good aspect to have in policy. However, the nature of investigations is such that oftentimes, 30 days is insufficient to complete a case. This can be the result of myriad factors, which can include caseload, case complexity, forensic

electronic analysis, and lab analysis. Accordingly, many cases exceed the 30-day expectation. This is an important point, because analysis of caseloads generally considers monthly case assignment totals. If investigators do not close cases within 30 days, the caseload of the investigator increases, which can lead to inefficiency and ineffectiveness (we will discuss this further below).

SOP 2.17 relates to supervisory audits of investigators. Like SOP 2.2, it is unclear whether supervisors are following this SOP. We see value in both of these SOPs and encourage their use.

SOP 2.20 outlines rules and staffing levels for investigators. From the data provided, we were unable to determine that there are two investigators working nights (the work schedule shows only one). The more salient point is that the investigations bureau has worked short by several positions, making it difficult to maintain adequate staffing and workloads.

#### SECTION IV: WORKLOAD

We received various data from APD concerning the workload of investigators relating to case assignment, case clearance, and caseloads. Through our interviews, we learned that on-duty sergeants review cases initially and then again on a daily basis by the report-reviewing unit. The duty sergeant can refer the case back to patrol, or they can request that it move to investigations. The case-reviewing unit refers any appropriate cases to the supervisors of the respective investigations unit. If the case-reviewing unit refers a case to the investigations supervisor, they will review it for assignment to a detective. Table 48 below, provides a listing of the total number of cases assigned to investigators between 2011-and 2014.

**TABLE 48: Cases Assigned by Year**

Year	Counts	% Change
2011	1553	
2012	1167	-24.86%
2013	1274	9.17%
2014	1435	12.64%

Source: 2015 Alexandria PD Investigations Bureau Workload Assessment

Based on Table 48, case assignments were down dramatically in 2012, but they have climbed back up to nearly the same total as the number assigned in 2011. It is also important to consider Chief Huchler’s statements relating to availability. Given the reduced number of investigations, some cases that were likely solvable, were not assigned to a detective. This results in a skewed workload number, but more importantly, it suggests an inability to meet customer and department needs.

Table 49 below provides a breakdown of the cases assigned between 2011 and 2014, by type. However, the number of *cases* reflected is deceiving because of how the computer crimes unit reports their data. This unit reflects each piece of electronic evidence they analyze as a case, which is not analogous to how other units count their cases. The result is an inflated *case count*.

**TABLE 49: Cases Assigned by Type 2011 - 2014**

Assignment Area/Type*	2011	2012	2013	2014	% Change 2013-2014
Burglary	168	151	291	321	10.31%
Financial Crimes	161	95	81	72	-11.11%
Auto Theft	180	63	43	77	79.07%
Computer Crimes**	83	66	74	207	179.73%
Youth	409	295	318	341	7.23%
Adult Sex Offenses	64	35	61	54	-11.48%
Robbery	179	163	126	147	16.67%
Homicide Unit	84	71	55	49	-10.91%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1328</b>	<b>939</b>	<b>1049</b>	<b>1268</b>	<b>20.88%</b>

Source: 2015 Alexandria PD Investigations Bureau Workload Assessment

\*Excludes polygraph examinations.

\*\*Computer crime totals represent the total number of examinations; some cases have multiple items.

There is also another issue with the data in Table 49, which is not readily apparent. The department does not currently have a detective assigned to auto theft, and accordingly, case assignments in this category for 2014 are half of what they were in 2011. There were 374 reported auto thefts in 2011, with 180 case assignments, or roughly 50%. There were 253 auto thefts reported in 2014, with only 77 cases assigned, which is about 30%. This is an example of a lack of capacity to manage investigative workload.

It is an important point to note that the data in Table 49 represents the number of cases assigned. It does not reflect cases with the potential for successful conclusion that supervisors did not assign to a detective because of a capacity issue. Our assessment relies on the data provided as they relate to actual cases assigned and worked. Accordingly, if supervisors have diverted a substantial amount of cases, due to workload limitations, this could negatively skew our data and findings.

Table 50 below provides a breakdown of the cases assigned by unit for years 2012-2014, including totals for case clearance and arrest. This table also shows the percentage of clearance for each of the categories. Clearance and arrest percentages for the violent crimes unit and the special victims unit have declined sharply between 2012 and 2014. For the violent crimes unit, case assignments are similar, but clearance rates are down by more than 20%. In the special victims unit, case assignments are up by more than

16%, and case clearances are down by 6.5%. The property crimes unit had fewer cases assigned during this period, but their clearance rate is down nearly 10%.

**TABLE 50: Cases Assignment, Clearance, and Arrest by Unit**

Number of Investigations	2012				2013				2014			
	Assigned	Cleared	Arrest	Closed %	Assigned	Cleared	Arrest	Closed %	Assigned	Cleared	Arrest	Closed %
Violent Crimes Unit	269	183	64	91.82%	242	145	63	85.95%	250	138	40	71.20%
Special Victims Unit	292	233	25	88.36%	318	249	33	88.68%	341	266	13	81.82%
Property Crimes Unit	437	193	93	65.45%	428	146	84	53.74%	398	138	83	55.53%
DV/Financial Computer Crimes Unit	95	59	28	91.58%	81	70	33	127.16%	72	65	23	122.22%
Vice and Narcotics Unit	255	81	40	47.45%	97	53	19	74.23%	61	57	21	127.87%
Electronics Surveillance Unit	191	191	0	100.00%	108	108	0	100.00%	160	160	0	100.00%
Totals	1,539	940	250	77.32%	1,274	771	232	78.73%	1,282	824	180	78.32%

Reductions in clearance rates may occur based on numerous factors. These can include, but are not limited to the quality of the preliminary investigation, deterioration of community trust (and cooperation), assignment of cases that have little chance of being solved, and capacity issues. In our analysis, we found no clear explanation for this downward trend. However, the shortage of six full-time positions in the investigations bureau could be a significant contributing factor.

### Detective Caseloads

Using staffing information provided in Table 46, we calculated the average caseloads for investigations personnel. Because of the variety of investigative responsibilities by unit and detective, along with the potential complexities of any type of investigation, average caseloads per investigator, by themselves, are not an appropriate metric for measuring performance. However, they do provide insight into the workload. Table 51 below provides insight into this metric, showing increases in the caseload per detective in nearly all categories, with the exception of adult sex crimes, and homicides; both of these show minor decreases.

**TABLE 51: Average Annual Caseloads per Detective 2013-2014**

Assignment Area/Type*	2013	Cases Per Invest.	2014	Cases Per Invest.
Burglary	291	58.2	321	64.2
Financial Crimes	81	27	72	36
Auto Theft	43	43	77	77
Computer Crimes	74	74	207	103.5
Youth	318	53	341	56.83
Adult Sex Offenses	61	30.5	54	27
Robbery	126	31.5	147	36.75
Homicide Unit	55	18.33	49	16.33
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1049</b>		<b>1268</b>	

Source: 2015 Alexandria PD Investigations Bureau Workload Assessment

In Table 52 below, we calculated the average amount of hours each investigator has available for each case. This model engages the workload hours available as calculated in Table 47 above.

**TABLE 52: Investigative Capacity per Detective - 2014**

	Cases Assigned	Number of Detectives	Annual Cases per Detective	Monthly Average per Detective	Average Available Hours per Year	Average Hours Available per Month	Average Hours Available per Case
<b>Persons</b>							
Homicide	49	3	16.33	1.36	1660	138.33	101.63
Robbery	147	4	36.75	3.06	1660	138.33	45.17
Adult Sex Offenses	54	2	27.00	2.25	1660	138.33	61.48
Youth	341	6	56.83	4.74	1660	138.33	29.21
<b>Property</b>							
Burglary	321	4	80.25	6.69	1660	138.33	20.69
Financial Crimes	72	3	24.00	2.00	1660	138.33	69.17
Auto Theft	77	1	77.00	6.42	1660	138.33	21.56
Computer Crimes	207	3*	69.00	5.75	1660	138.33	24.06

\* Includes one non-sworn position.

\*\*The above totals assume full staffing of allocated positions.

As we have mentioned, there are no set standards for case assignments. To illustrate this, in other engagements, the range of monthly case assignments for crimes against

persons was 3.3-9.6, and the range for property crimes was 5.5-9.2. Admittedly, these are broad ranges, but they do encompass the ratios we found at APD.

One of the numbers reflected in Table 52 above is the total number of hours available for each investigator for each case. However, this number reflects the total number of work hours available for each investigator, and it presumes that they do nothing else but casework. Accordingly, this number is relative, and based on other non-investigative work they perform it will go down.

Based on our observations and on interviews with detectives and supervisory personnel, we know that other duties, primarily report writing, consume a substantial amount of daily activity. To quantify investigative and non-investigative work efforts, we provided an Internet-based survey to the detectives; we did not collect any identifiable information in the survey. Table 53 below shows the results of the workload question from the survey.

**TABLE 53: Investigations Survey**

Question: What percentage of your 40-hour workweek (exclusive of overtime) do you spend on each of the following activities? Your total responses must equal 100%.

<b>Category Options*</b>	<b>Response Average %</b>
Administrative/Other	11.57
Arrest	2.80
Community Contact	1.77
Crime Lab	0.37
Crime Scene Processing	0.43
Court/Trial Prep	3.20
District Attorney Follow-Up	2.91
Evidence Views/Disposition	1.49
Interviews	11.86
Investigations	24.74
Legal (e.g. Search Warrant, Arrest Warrant)	4.46
Meetings	5.26
Phone Calls/Emails	6.17
Report Writing	10.54
Supervisory Duties	1.29
Surveillance	4.60
Teaching	0.94
Threat Assessment	0.80
Training	0.89
Travel/Driving	3.97
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Self-reported survey data, Alexandria PD Investigators.

\*Survey data excludes investigators whose primary duties are crime scene investigation and those who reported more than 25% of their responsibilities as supervisory.

From this self-reported data, we note that administrative/other, meetings, and phone call/emails, account for nearly 23% of the time available for detectives. Assuming these data are relatively accurate, they would reduce the available time for investigators by 382 hours annually, to roughly 1,278 hours. Of course, this would also affect the amount of time investigators have available for each case.

One aspect of work that we did not identify in Table 53 above is community policing. The fact that certain officers work in the investigations unit does not mean they cannot or should not engage in community policing efforts. Those assigned to investigations tend to include the most tenured and capable officers in police agencies (see Table 18 – Experience Profile above), and accordingly, they have much to contribute from a

community policing perspective. Police agencies in general, and APD in particular, would benefit from engaging detectives in the community policing process. Whether this occurs independently or collaboratively, we encourage this practice. However, doing so will reduce further the available hours detectives have available for investigative work, so integrating detectives into the community policing process should be done with an understanding of how this shifts the work burden, and the need for additional personnel in the investigations bureau.

**TABLE 54: Self-Reported Current and Preferred Investigative Caseload**

Question (two-part):  
 How many active cases/investigations do you personally manage on average?  
 What do you think the optimal number of active cases should be for each investigator in your unit?

Investigations Caseload	Current Load	Preferred Load
Crime Scene	15.43	8.71
Fraud/Financial Crimes	10.67	6
Homicide/Violent Crime	7	4.67
Other Crimes Against Persons	10.88	6.25
Property Crimes	24	9
Vice/Narcotics	3.40	4.8

Source: Self-reported survey data, Alexandria PD Investigators

In the survey that we provided to investigators, we also asked them to identify how many cases they routinely manage, and how many they felt was optimal. Table 54 above outlines these responses. For most of the categories provided, detectives self-reported current caseloads that are significantly higher than they would prefer.

Table 54 also provides some insight into case closure timelines. In Table 51, we provided the average number of monthly cases per detective, based on dividing the number of allocated personnel by the number of cases for each unit. Two significant aspects of those data that are worth mentioning. First, the detective unit has been operating with a shortage of personnel. Accordingly, the averages are inaccurate, and they relate to allocated personnel, not staffed personnel. Second, the average number of cases per detective only establishes how many cases supervisors assign to them; it does not take into account how long it takes to close those cases. As noted earlier, we know that not all cases resolve within 30 days, and Table 54 suggests this, as it contrasts the monthly case assignments listed in Table 51. The current caseloads shown in Table 54 are greater than the monthly average assigned, meaning that some cases are not resolved within 30 days.

In the investigators survey, we also asked a question about case closure expectations in terms of how many days the cases should be active. We have provided the responses to this question in Table 55 below. As we noted earlier, SOPs 1.1 and 2.2 provide clear

expectations for case closures within 30 days. Accordingly, we would have expected this information to show up in the survey responses. Instead, the responses varied greatly. This suggests a lack of knowledge or understanding of the 30-day closure expectation, an inability to meet that expectation with any regularity, and/or a lack of accountability by supervisors of investigators in terms of meeting these timelines.

**TABLE 55: Self-Reported Case Closure Expectations in Days Active**

Question: What is the expected timeline for case closure for your unit? If you unit has not identified such a timeline, what timeline would be appropriate?

	<b>0-30</b>	<b>31-60</b>	<b>61-90</b>	<b>Over 90</b>	<b># of Responses</b>
Serious Persons Crimes	10	9	4	10	33
Other Persons Crimes	8	10	4	1	23
Property Crimes	5	5	6	3	19
Fraud/Financial Crimes	3	2	12	4	21

Source: Self-reported survey data, Alexandria PD Investigators.

Although SOPs outline the expectations for case closures, as we have noted, this is not always reasonable or feasible. The significant increase in the use of social media outlets by victims and suspects has significantly influenced investigative methods. The need for detectives to obtain subpoenas and search warrants to collect information from these sources has substantially increased the overall duration and complexity of investigations. Interviews and observations of APD detectives support this trend. In addition, forensic examinations of evidence, either by the lab or for electronic evidence, dramatically increase the time required to complete investigations. These complexities and delays mean that investigators often carry cases far longer than 30 days. This is an area that investigative supervisors should monitor and supervise closely, as large caseloads can reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of an investigator.

In our examination of detective activity, we also reviewed monthly activity reports for the investigations division from September through November of 2015. We have summarized these data in Table 56 below.

**TABLE 56: Investigations Monthly Activity: September – November 2015**

Activity in Hours	Units					
	Domestic Violence	Financial Crimes	Property Crimes	Special Victims	Violent Crimes	Vice Narcotics
Assist Officer or Other Detective	91	106.5	535	141	438.5	808
Assist Other Agency	14.5	41	81	94	141	204
Assist Citizen	0	0	14	10	12.75	0
Special Detail	40	6	24	106	153.75	0

Activity in Hours	Units					
	Domestic Violence	Financial Crimes	Property Crimes	Special Victims	Violent Crimes	Vice Narcotics
New Cases Assigned	125	22	66	81	104	40
Cases Closed - Total Number	87	11	22	75	72	*
Arrests	9	10	9	8	33	20
Warrants (Magistrate)	28	16	31	10	73	104
Court Orders (Judge, CA)	13	25	6	16	30	*
Posters Disseminated	5	4	9	8	20	*
Suspect Interviews	3	11	39	38	49	*
Victim Interviews	77	30	94	76	79	*
Other Interviews	24	20	58	69	113	*
						*
Original Reports	4	13	1	17	5	*
Supplemental Reports	107	51	101	132	188	*

\*No data reported

These data, along with the self-reported data from our survey, provide additional insight into the regular activities of the detectives. However, these tables do not provide data concerning the amount of time required by investigators to complete each case. Again, each case is different, and variations in cases can cause some cases to take an inordinately long time to complete. Still, tracking case effort in terms of hours spent could be a significant factor in making future staffing determinations. The new RMS at APD has the capacity to track work effort in this regard, and we encourage this going forward.

## SECTION V: RECOMMENDATIONS

### Primary Recommendations

#### *Recommendation: Maintain Investigations Staffing for CIS*

Based on the factors examined in this study, current staffing levels in the persons and property investigations areas are sufficient to meet present demands. Further augmentation is not required. However, we recommend that the department fill and maintain all allocated positions within the investigations bureau. In addition, we recommend continued monitoring of caseloads to determine future staffing needs. Other than the adjustment to the domestic violence unit mentioned below, we do not see any other span of control issues that require attention.

#### *Recommendation: Prioritize Investigations Staffing*

The proper functioning of a criminal investigations division within a police agency is vital to its operations, second only in importance to a well-functioning patrol division. However, the investigation function, like uniformed patrol, is susceptible to inefficiency when not properly staffed. Criminal investigations take considerable time, focus, and effort, and when investigators are overwhelmed with a caseload that is prohibitive, it reduces their effectiveness. Accordingly, once appropriate staffing levels in investigations are determined, the department should take appropriate steps to ensure continuous staffing of all positions.

As with the patrol division, the department should take a position that all investigations assignments are *essential* and backfill any vacancies in investigations from personnel in less-essential roles within the organization.

#### *Recommendation: Revisit Staffing for Vice/Narcotics*

In May of 2015, Deputy Chief Huchler, who oversees the investigations division, provided an analysis of and a set of recommendations regarding the Vice/Narcotics section under his command. In his memorandum, Deputy Chief Huchler did a thorough job of explaining safety concerns, and the operational limitations and costs associated with operating the Vice/Narcotics unit in its current configuration. These arguments are sound; the rationale for augmenting this unit is reasonable, and we recommend revisiting this request. In its current configuration and staffing level, this unit is experiencing significant challenges in meeting objectives. The unit is functional, but must often rely on other internal personnel for many operations. Although this seems to be working, it pulls resources from other areas, which is not optimal.

Changes to this unit, made in 2010, involved the reallocation of several officers, previously assigned to the *street crimes unit*. We take no position on the policy decision made in this regard. However, Deputy Chief Huchler's observations and assessment, which other personnel from the unit affirmed during our interviews, suggest that adding staff to this section will improve officer safety and outcomes, and provide the unit with a significant increase in operational functionality. We advocate for further analysis of the needs and mission of this section within the investigations division, and recommend allocating additional personnel as determined by that evaluation.

***Recommendation: Define Expectations and Monitor Case Closure Timelines***

One of the keys to successfully operating an investigations bureau relies upon investigators closing cases with an appropriate balance of speed and thoroughness. Although, for a variety of reasons, some cases take longer to complete, generally the longer an investigator holds a case open, the larger his or her caseload becomes. As the investigator's caseload expands, his or her effectiveness tends to dwindle. Consequently, it is of significant value to ensure that investigators are prompt in their investigations, quickly closing cases they can, and suspending those that are no longer viable.

In our survey of the department's investigators, we asked about unit expectations for case closure. The responses by the investigators, which varied greatly, suggested at a minimum, a lack of clarity in understanding those expectations. The lack of consistency in the responses also suggests that monitoring of case closure timelines may need improvement. Although standard operating procedures (SOPs) outline and identify these expectations, there is an apparent need to affirm these expectations and practices for both investigators and supervisors.

**Secondary Recommendations**

***Recommendation: Utilize the Case Tracking System within Records to its Full Potential***

One of the above primary recommendations involves case closure and monitoring of the investigative caseload by supervisors. Ancillary to this recommendation is the monitoring of the size of the caseloads managed by individual investigators. The new records management system (RMS) at APD has the capacity to track case assignments, to monitor investigator activity (which could be important in future resource determinations), and to conduct regular case reviews by the supervisor. We recommend that all investigation assignments, tracking, and monitoring, occur within this system. Further, we recommend that investigative supervisors engage with other agencies with the same RMS to determine the best practices and most effective use of the case-tracking module (the vendor can supply you with a recommended list).

***Recommendation: Examine the Case Assignment Process for Investigations***

In our interviews, we learned that various persons review cases for a determination of assignment to investigations. This can occur at the duty sergeant level, by the sergeant reviewing the daily paperwork, or by the supervisor of the investigative unit; officers can also recommend referral of a case to investigations. We also learned that those reviewing cases for assignment rely on *solvability factors*, though this reliance seemed anecdotal, as opposed to being a regimented process.

In our review of APD policy, we found that Appendix A, 10.10, Criminal Investigations [42.1.2] A - Solvability Factors, addresses the value of solvability factors. However, it does not appear that the reporting system integrates these specifically, either directly within records, or through the report of the responding officer. We recommend a modification to the reporting process that intentionally integrates and records the presence of solvability factors. The new RMS at APD has the capacity to do this. Adding these factors to the process will serve two vital purposes. First, officers may approach preliminary investigations differently if they know they must answer each of the solvability factor questions. Second, those reviewing the report for possible assignment can quickly assess its overall solvability factor, which should improve the efficiency and expedience of the case review process. This process may also reduce the need for a second or third review of these reports by other personnel.

***Recommendation: Add Redundancy to the Electronic Forensics Area***

With the advent of everything electronic, the ability of an investigative team to examine various pieces of electronic media forensically has become a necessity. The number of cases requiring such attention is growing, and this area is highly labor intensive. Given the need for this capacity, it is important that departments ensure they have sufficient staff to conduct these analyses. Moreover, this area of investigative work requires great expertise and significant training, to ensure the legal foundation of the collection of this evidence.

To ensure that APD maintains a consistent capacity to conduct such investigations and electronic forensic work, we recommend ensuring redundant training and certification of multiple personnel for this unit.

***Recommendation: Consider Revisions to the Domestic Violence Investigations Division and to the Preliminary Investigation of Domestic Violence by Patrol Officers***

1. *Create a Supervisor Position with the D/V investigations Unit*

Domestic violence has become a national focal point throughout law enforcement, and appropriately, many departments have established domestic violence investigation (D/V) units. The D/V unit at APD has three detectives assigned to it, and each handled roughly 300 cases in 2014. This is a large number, but it is actually a reduction from the average in 2013, which was more than 500 each. In our interviews, we learned that the sergeant from the financial crimes unit spends considerable time supplanting the D/V unit, and providing supervisory oversight. Given the volume within this unit, we recommend the conversion of one of the positions within this unit to a sergeant. We also recommend this person carry a regular caseload.

We also considered whether the needs of this unit justify another officer, as opposed to the conversion of one position. It is our assessment that implementing a Lethality Assessment Protocol (LAP) in patrol (as noted immediately below) will reduce the overall demand for this unit, and balance the workload among the three persons (with the sergeant included).

2. *Implement an LAP Protocol within the Patrol Division*

During the course of our interviews, we learned that APD does not use a Lethality Assessment Protocol (LAP) in its domestic violence investigations by patrol officers. We also heard (and noted through the data) that the D/V investigators have a high caseload, which requires substantial work. When implemented properly, the use of an LAP can reduce the incidence of violence against women; and improve the overall quality of the preliminary investigation, ultimately reducing the demand on the D/V investigations unit. We recommend adding an LAP to preliminary domestic violence investigations by patrol. There are existing models available (IACP can assist with this), which can be implemented readily.

3. *Re-organize the DV Investigations Unit*

The D/V investigation unit is currently part of the property crimes section within the criminal investigations division. D/V is a crime against a person, and its location within the organizational structure may be better suited within the crimes against persons section. Aside from the apparent logic in such a move, the D/V unit may benefit from the support staff associated with this section. We recommend consideration of reorganizing the D/V investigations unit to fall under the crimes against persons section.

### SUPPLEMENTAL RECOMMENDATIONS

As is typical, during the course of our study of the APD, we came upon several items of value that were beyond the initial scope of our contracted work. Because these items are supplemental, we did not perform a deep analysis of each. Therefore, we offer the following items based on our limited engagement and observations in these areas.

#### *Recommendation: Revise the Case Reporting Practice of the Electronic Forensic Team*

At present, the electronic forensic team reports each item examined as a *case* as part of the case assignment totals for the unit, as opposed to reporting only the total number of cases assigned. This type of reporting is deceiving in terms of comparing caseloads against other units. Although there is value in recording the number of devices examined, and this contributes to an understanding of overall workload, we recommend reporting only the total number of case assignments when comparing caseloads against other units.

#### *Recommendation: Training*

##### *1. Training Records:*

In our efforts to quantify the amount of annual training for officers, we discovered several apparent omissions/discrepancies within the training records for individual officers. There may be myriad explanations for these issues, but we are convinced that in many cases, the officer's official training record does not accurately reflect his or her actual attendance at training. This could be a significant issue if the officer's training record comes into question. We recommend a thorough analysis of the record-keeping practices regarding individual officer training, making any necessary procedural revisions to ensure accuracy.

##### *2. Leadership Training:*

During our interviews, we heard from several personnel who indicated there is a lack of available leadership training for those at APD. Like most agencies, those in leadership positions often have access to such training, but aspiring leaders, or those in line-level leadership roles, often do not have regular opportunities for formal leadership training. We recommend an intentional focus on providing leadership training for command and executive leader, line- and mid-level leaders, and for those who aspire to leadership positions. All too often, an officer's first opportunity to attend leadership training occurs after his or her promotion. We advocate for a process that engages these opportunities much

sooner, and with greater regularity. This is particularly important for APD, due to the large turnover, resulting in an inexperienced workforce (see Table 18), and IACP has many resources available to assist with this type of training.

3. *Mentoring:*

Like leadership training, officers often lack the exposure to circumstances that help them learn and grow. We recommend consideration of a formal mentorship program within APD. Further, we would suggest identification of those who have an apparent future as leaders (as assessed by organizational supervisors), as the first invited to take advantage of the new program.

4. *Community Based Policing:*

APD has an organizational philosophy that encourages community-based policing, and this is evident in the training provided at the academy, as well as the community-based project that officers must complete during PTO. However, there is little evidence to suggest that APD offers and/or promotes ongoing training in community policing for seasoned officers. Given the changing climate and the societal demands on law enforcement, we recommend mandatory ongoing community policing training for officers at APD.

***Recommendation: Re-evaluate Specialty Assignments***

The purpose of this study was to examine staffing levels in the patrol and investigations divisions, including an examination of how various units (SRO, K9, and motors, etc.) support the patrol and investigations function. Although these units do provide a certain level of support to both patrol and investigations, specialty units have their own unique function, and as such, they tend to focus their efforts in those areas. In our experience, we have found that some agencies have inadvertently moved away from the core functions of policing, and in some cases, become over-specialized.

Our recommendations concerning additional staffing can be resolved through adding personnel to the department, and our assessment is that the organization needs to hire additional personnel. However, some of our staffing recommendations may also occur through a reorganization of personnel from other assignments. Notably, the department has a relatively low percentage of its overall sworn strength assigned to patrol responsibilities, which in and of itself, suggests the need to assess where the agency has deployed its personnel. We recommend an internal analysis of all sworn personnel assignments to determine whether specialized units should remain intact, and whether personnel assignments within those units should be supplemented, or reduced. This evaluation should include an examination of the overall performance of all specialized units, and the organizational structure, including supervisory and command positions.

***Recommendation: Merge the COPS Unit and Crime Prevention Unit***

During the course of our study, we had an opportunity to meet with officers from the COPS unit, and we met with the officer from the crime prevention unit. Through this process, we learned that the crime prevention unit has only one member. We were impressed with the work occurring in each unit, but feel that a single member in the crime prevention unit is likely less effective than what is optimal. Both of these units have a similar mission and believe that combining them would improve the effectiveness of the crime prevention officer, and the COPS unit.

***Recommendation: Improve Internal Communications***

In our conversations with officers and supervisors, we heard mixed comments concerning communication within the department. Many officers expressed strong positive communication with their direct supervisor, but some also expressed that communication up the chain of command was not as effective. Several officers also stated that they felt the line-level supervisors did not have a strong voice with those at the command level.

Virtually every organization has some level of discord with regard to communication. We do not feel that the organizational communication at APD is poor, quite the contrary. We observed good communication and knowledge throughout the organization of various initiatives, which leads us to believe that intentional communication efforts are present. Despite these positive observations, the suggestion that line-level leaders may be having difficulty with communication with command staff is cause for concern. Therefore, we recommend additional engagement of line-level leaders by command personnel to address any communication issues. We also recommend ongoing and continued efforts to encourage communication throughout the organization.

***Recommendation: Examine Staffing for Crime Analysis Unit***

Data driven policing strategies have become a central component to modern policing. Further, using data analytics for predictive policing has also grown in popularity and in value. Because these personnel perform such a vital role, the demands on them are increasing, which challenges their capacity to meet expectations. We did not examine staffing in the crime analysis unit as a part of this study. However, some expressed the need to supplement staffing in this area; we recommend examining this unit to determine an appropriate staffing level.

## CHAPTER VI: SUMMARY

Our analysis of the Alexandria Police Department suggests that leaders are consciously engaged in running the department in progressive and positive manner, and that those within the organization, from command to line staff, take great pride in providing exemplary service to the public. During our interviews, we asked members of the organization to provide feedback concerning the department, both positive and negative. We heard a series of compliments and positive statements about that the department is doing well, and we provide a partial list here:

- Citizen academy
- Communication, internally and externally (despite concerns over communication issues with first-line supervisors)
- Use of data analysis
- Good equipment and facility
- Organizational culture
- Engaged in multiple civic organizations
- Public image
- Caring for staff
- Solving crime and serving the community well


In addition to the things that staff mentioned, we made personal observations of many of these things. In one case, we witnessed an officer helping a homeless person, and in another case, we witnessed a detective receiving an outstanding service award from the department. We also note the proactive steps the agency has taken in examining various work practices, including engaging this study. We feel this is reflective of a desire to advance the policing mission for the city, and we applaud the police department for taking this step.

Despite all of the positive aspects of the work environment at APD, as our recommendations suggest, there are opportunities for improvement. Most notably, in our judgement, the department needs to re-emphasize the importance of the patrol and investigative functions, ensuring that adequate staffing is present in both. For patrol, at present, this includes augmenting the workforce. For investigations, we believe filling the current vacancies is a starting place, and that continued monitoring should occur to determine future staffing needs. As we mentioned, we also believe that in its present condition and without additional resources, it is difficult for the vice/narcotics unit to fulfill its mission. We recommend a revision to the mission, or an analysis to determine the number of personnel required to ensure it can accomplish established goals and objectives.


We feel compelled to add that although we have recommended adding 18 officers to patrol, 8 officers to the motors unit, and backfilling the open investigations positions, we cannot ascertain the number of personnel, if any, that should be allocated from existing resources, as opposed to those that should come from additional hires. This is because we did not evaluate the functionality of each of the department units. We suspect that making these adjustments will require a substantial influx of new personnel, and some reallocation of existing resources; however, the department will need to conduct further analysis to inform these decisions. Any additional analysis should also include an examination of the use of non-sworn personnel for assignments that do not require an officer, but which can reduce the obligated workload for officers. We also feel that the ability to engage over-hires would contribute significantly to resolving staff shortages.

## APPENDIX A: RESPONSE TIMES BY SECTOR AND HOUR


**Figure 20: Response Time by Sector/Hour: All Sectors - All Priorities**




**Figure 21: Response Time by Sector/Hour: All Sectors - Emergency Priority**




**Figure 22: Response Time by Sector/Hour: All Sectors – Immediate Priority**




**Figure 23: Response Time by Sector/Hour: All Sectors – Prompt Priority**




**Figure 24: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 1 - All Priorities**




**Figure 25: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 1 - Emergency Priority**




**Figure 26: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 1 - Immediate Priority**




**Figure 27: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 1 - Prompt Priority**




**Figure 28: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 2 - All Priorities**




**Figure 29: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 2 - Emergency Priority**




**Figure 30: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 2 - Immediate Priority**




**Figure 31: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 2 - Prompt Priority**




**Figure 32: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 3 - All Priorities**



**Figure 33: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 3 - Emergency Priority**



**Figure 34: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 3 - Immediate Priority**



**Figure 35: Response Time by Sector/Hour: Sector 3 - Prompt Priority**

